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MORE THAN A FEELING:  
EMOTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Rebecca Tushnet∗ 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan1 remains a foundational case even as 
the First Amendment issues occupying the courts today have significantly 
changed.  Modern speech regulations can take many forms; the “new 
school” Jack Balkin identifies has supplemented, rather than replaced, the 
“old school.”2  But the old school has also undergone some renovations.  
Rather than governing the New York Times, many of today’s trickiest 
speech regulations target speakers who aren’t traditional publishers, which 
makes it easier to treat these regulations as fringe cases and to overlook 
some deep contradictions in current doctrines. 
Here, I wish to examine one aspect of Sullivan, which is its require-
ment of a false factual statement, and the relationship of the falsity re-
quirement to ideas about harm and emotion.  Disparaging speech is usually 
harmful because it triggers negative emotions in the audience, causing oth-
er people to treat the victim differently.  First Amendment law has general-
ly been leery of government attempts to change the marketplace of emo-
tions — except when it has not been.  Scientific evidence indicates that 
emotion and rationality are not opposed, as the law often presumes, but ra-
ther inextricably linked.  There is no judgment, whether moral or other-
wise, without emotions to guide our choices.  Judicial failure to grapple 
with this reality has produced some puzzles in the law. 
Part I of this Symposium contribution will examine the intersection of 
private law, the First Amendment, and attempts to manipulate and control 
emotions.  After Sullivan, statutes and common law rules that authorize 
one person to control too much of another person’s speech can violate the 
First Amendment.  Another key aspect of Sullivan is that only false factual 
statements can defame, not mere derogatory opinions.  Yet trademark law 
allows exactly the kind of control over nonfactual, emotional appeals that 
modern defamation law precludes.  These two bodies of law thus stand in 
contrast, one constrained by the First Amendment to cover only facts and 
the other allowed to reach much further into the dark heart of emotional 
manipulation. 
Part II turns to compelled speech, and again finds two contrasting regu-
lations united by their emotional mechanisms, but divided by their consti-
tutional fates.  Courts have struck down mandatory smoking warnings in 
 ∗ Professor, Georgetown Law.  Thanks, as always, to Mark Tushnet. 
 1 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 2 See supra [Professor Balkin] TAN 1-195. 
1 
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visual form, but have approved mandatory abortion disclosures and ultra-
sound requirements that operate in the same emotional register.  Regard-
less of whether the regulation involves a direct government mandate or 
private parties claiming competing rights to influence the audience’s emo-
tional state, then, current First Amendment law doesn’t have a consistent 
account of the proper role of emotion in speech regulation. 
Part III suggests that the contradictions of current doctrine could be 
ameliorated by less distrust of emotion and more acceptance that where in-
formation is being conveyed, emotion will regularly follow.  Our focus 
then should not be on whether deployment of emotion is “manipulative,” 
but whether it is part of a discriminatory or factually misleading regula-
tion.  When the government regulates speech, the regulation will generally 
have an emotional component because human thought is emotional.  Ob-
jections to emotion-based regulations should not be based on the obvious-
ness of that component.  Rather, the acceptability of the government’s aim 
should be the guide, especially when nongovernmental speakers are free to 
use emotional appeals to press their own cases.  The government may be 
required to be neutral as between classes of private speakers, which Sulli-
van requires and which I will argue should be the case with respect to 
trademark law.  It is not required to be neutered.  When the government 
can otherwise constitutionally mandate disclosure, the fact that these dis-
closures have emotional resonance is not an independent constitutional 
barrier. 
I.  WHEN CAN PRIVATE PARTIES MANIPULATE EMOTIONS WITHOUT 
LIABILITY? 
Among many other things, Sullivan stands for a key principle of mod-
ern First Amendment law: if the government creates a legal remedy that 
allows a private plaintiff to hold a defendant liable for its speech, there are 
constitutional limits on the scope of that remedy.  Part II will take up more 
direct interventions by the government into the marketplace for speech.  
This Part considers instead how courts have reacted to legal regimes that 
empower certain classes of people to suppress others’ speech.  The overall 
marketplace of ideas is bounded and shaped by the allowable causes of ac-
tion.  A world in which people can’t call each other nasty names will have 
a different mix of speech than one in which contumely is the price of free-
dom. 
After Sullivan, the enforcement of private claims constitutes relevant 
government action to which First Amendment scrutiny can be directed.  
Alabama law allowed Sullivan to sue the New York Times for harming his 
reputation, just as trademark law allows trademark owners to sue alleged 
infringers and diluters.  While the Court sharply limited Alabama’s ability 
to authorize Sullivan to control the Times’s speech, trademark owners have 
enjoyed considerably more success in litigation.  This Part argues that, 
while emotional, nonfactual speech is now free to cause harm without be-
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ing deemed defamatory, trademark law regularly allows liability for the 
same kinds of speech. 
A.  Defamation Law (Herein of Facts and Nonfacts) 
Under modern defamation law, only false factual statements are action-
able.  That means not just that true statements are protected, but also that 
nonfalse statements are protected: a claim with no truth value at all cannot 
be defamatory.  This includes statements of pure opinion, unless they im-
ply the existence of particular defamatory factual claims.  
But why?  Statements of opinion, mockery, and even obviously false 
parodies can harm a person, not just in her own mind but in the esteem of 
others, with real consequences.  Consider President Ronald Reagan’s en-
tirely nonfactual but devastating “there you go again,” which helped sum 
up an entire line of political criticism, or Tina Fey’s deconstruction of 
then-Governor Sarah Palin.  Some theorists have claimed that only factual 
claims can affect reputation,3 but to say this is to redefine “reputation” as 
“that which can be changed only by factual claims.” 
Likewise, many accounts of free speech rest on claims about the value 
of factual information, combined with claims about the danger that mistak-
en verdicts will chill truthful speech.  If truthful information is important 
to allow audiences to form opinions about third parties, and if we need 
breathing room to induce speakers to provide that information, then we 
should err on the side of caution before suppressing factual claims.4  But 
this analysis fails to explain the role of nonfacts in communication.  In or-
der for an audience to have any interest in taking nonfacts into account in 
forming their judgments, the audience has to be potentially swayed by 
those nonfacts.  If only truth matters, by contrast, then the audience loses 
nothing from the suppression of nonfacts.  The only concern would be the 
risk of chill, which could be dealt with by erring on the side of deeming a 
statement to be factual.  The constitutional requirement that the harm-
causing speech be factually false (and therefore falsifiable), not just derog-
atory, substantially narrows the potential scope of laws that regulate 
speech.5  That is, the fact requirement protects speech from suppression by 
 3 See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Defamation Claims Based on Parody and Other Fanciful Communica-
tions Not Intended to Be Understood as Fact, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 875, 877 (asserting that reputational 
harm requires others to accept false information). 
 4 See Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
1341, 1418–20 (2011); see also id. at 1424 (discussing risks posed to an audience’s decisionmaking by 
untrue information but not by true information). 
 5 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that, when a jury decided 
that a Hustler “parody could not ‘reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [Falwell] or 
actual events in which [he] participated,’” id. at 49 (second alteration in original), and thus Falwell 
couldn’t claim defamation, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was also unavailable); 
Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078–79, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 
1998) (allowing infringement and dilution claims to proceed in a case involving a film’s use of a televi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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juries or judges unwilling to tolerate deviation from the majority opinion.6  
The falsifiability rule also allows speakers to express their own moral and 
philosophical frameworks, including appeals to emotion. 
In line with defamation law’s rule that mere vitriol is not actionable un-
less it includes specific false facts, the deliberate infliction of emotional 
distress on specific targets is also regularly protected by the First Amend-
ment.7  Likewise, the Court has struck down flagburning regulations de-
signed to safeguard the emotional resonance of the American flag.8  So, 
according to defamation law, citizens are expected to have a certain kind 
of hardiness.  No matter whether plaintiffs are public or private figures, 
mere insults or aspersions cannot justify a defamation lawsuit, unless they 
are accompanied by specific stated or implied defamatory facts.  Facts 
trigger emotions, but emotions can exist without facts, and any harm 
caused by nonfacts is just too bad for the victim.  My enemies can use pa-
thos to convince the rest of the world that I am a horrible person, even if 
that causes me tangible economic loss.  (Or another kind of loss: recently 
the prosecution in a criminal case failed to prevent the defense from refer-
ring to the prosecution as “the government,” presumably to trigger nega-
tive associations.9) 
The upshot is that outrageousness is generally not enough to justify 
suppression of speech under the U.S. Constitution, with the exception of 
obscenity.  This outcome is more surprising than we usually admit, as Pro-
fessor Andrew Koppelman has pointed out: 
sion network’s trademark, but dismissing defamation claims because there were no “factual asser-
tion[s],” id. at 1081). 
 6 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (clarifying that statements that 
aren’t falsifiable, including opinions, are entitled to full First Amendment protection). 
 7 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“[S]peech [at a public place on a mat-
ter of public concern] cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.  ‘If there 
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’  Indeed, 
‘the point of all speech protection . . . is to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes 
are misguided, or even hurtful.’” (omission in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989), then quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of 
Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995))); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–
44 (1977) (per curiam) (reversing an injunction against a Nazi march through a city populated by many 
Holocaust survivors). 
 8 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (holding that a state’s interest in preserving the symbolic value of 
the flag couldn’t justify criminalization). 
 9 See Motion in Limine Two at 1, State v. Powell, No. I-CR086639B (Cir. Crim. Ct. Williamson 
Cnty., Tenn. May 22, 2013) (motion to instruct defense counsel not to refer to the prosecution as “the 
Government” during trial because “[t]he State believes that such a reference is used in a derogatory 
way and is meant to make the State’s attorneys seem oppressive and to inflame the jury”); Paul Alan 
Levy, Is It Worse to Be Called “the Government” than “the State of Tennessee? [sic], CONSUMER L. & 
POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 30, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog 
/2013/10/is-it-worse-to-be-called-the-government-than-the-state-of-tennessee-.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P6W7-NGT5 (reporting that the motion was denied). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Pornographers, Nazis, and other transgressors of the sacred . . . form a stable 
alliance with civil libertarians.  This valorization of “sponsoring study-abroad 
sojourns in the land of fire and brimstone” is peculiar.  Most “cultures do not 
train souls for the ironic contortionism that liberal subjectivity calls for.”  Ra-
ther, most of the world’s population “cannot hear certain things without want-
ing to hit somebody.”  Free speech is a distinctive cultural formation, and 
those who would maintain it had better know what it is that they are maintain-
ing.10 
Modern defamation law bars suppression of speech that makes its offended 
targets want to hit somebody.  But what if the speech makes listeners want 
something else, like a new brand instead of a familiar one? 
B.  Trademark Law 
This section considers two kinds of trademark claims — infringement 
and dilution.  Infringement, at least in its core version, is when consumers 
are confused about the source or sponsorship of the defendant’s goods, and 
think they come from the plaintiff or are endorsed by the plaintiff.  Dilu-
tion, at least in theory, is conduct that harms a trademark even in the ab-
sence of confusion, by “whittling away” its value in some mysterious 
way.11  While dilution is more obviously based on concepts of emotional 
harm, courts have also accepted theories about emotional damage to brand 
value as a reason to find infringement. 
Trademark law therefore presently authorizes the kind of private con-
trol over emotional meaning that defamation law’s limitation to facts pre-
cludes: the government provides a remedy as between two private parties 
when one interferes with the emotional valence of the other.  A trademark 
owner can prevent other commercial actors from making its customers feel 
less respect for its trademark, even if the mechanism is purely emotional.  
This power can’t be justified by trademark-specific concepts of economic 
harm or property. 
Trademark lawyers have embraced the concept that emotion and stories 
are much more effective than facts, where “effective” is defined as the 
ability to generate sales.12  As a result, it’s easy for them to conclude that 
anything that affects a trademark’s emotional resonance ought to be within 
the scope of trademark law — after all, it could affect sales.  As Professor 
Barton Beebe has written, trademark law has become a means of preserv-
 10 Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free Speech Theory, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 647, 712 (2013) (citations omitted) (quoting JOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS: 
FREE SPEECH AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION 14, 93 (2005)). 
 11 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Sci-
ence, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) (arguing against the cognitive theory of trademark dilution). 
 12 See Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1227, 1260–77 (2008). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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ing the creation of distinction, creating a modern sumptuary code.13  
Courts routinely protect the aura of distinction and uniqueness claimed by 
a trademark owner.14  In Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & 
Co.,15 for example, the influential Second Circuit enjoined a copyist of 
Levi’s stitching, ostensibly on confusion grounds, because otherwise Levi’s 
sales would be “affected adversely by . . . buyers’ ultimate realization that 
the pattern is no longer exclusive.”16  Other cases similarly have found in-
fringement because trademark owners’ prestige — and the prestige of their 
customers — was at stake.17  As one oft-cited case held, a copyist was in-
fringing because some of its customers would buy its cheaper product “for 
the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visi-
tors at the customers’ homes would regard as a prestigious article.”18 
In other words, trademark protection in the absence of consumer confu-
sion at the point of sale is justified, at least in part, as a means of preserv-
ing the status of consumers of “true” luxury products, even if no one ever 
makes a mistaken purchase.  The pain of lost distinction may well be a 
true psychic harm, but wounded pride or dignity would not be enough to 
sustain a defamation claim without a false statement of fact.19  When we 
allow trademark law to avoid the constraint of requiring a false factual 
 13 See generally Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 809 (2010). 
 14 See id. at 851. 
 15 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 16 Id. at 875–76. 
 17 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he purchaser of an original may be harmed if the widespread existence of knockoffs decreases the 
original’s value by making the previously scarce commonplace . . . .”); Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris 
Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he purchaser of an original [luxury good] is 
harmed by the widespread existence of knockoffs because the high value of originals, which derives in 
part from their scarcity, is lessened.”); Ill. High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (stating that a “proliferation of borrowings” may deprive a mark “of [its] distinctiveness and 
prestige”); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1237 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (protecting Ferrari’s “image of exclusivity” and using harm to uniqueness to justify a finding 
of infringement); Cartier, Inc. v. Deziner Wholesale, L.L.C., No. 98 Civ. 4947 (RLC), 2000 WL 
347171, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2000) (“[I]t is also likely that these sophisticated, brand conscious con-
sumers will lose interest in the Cartier name as they see the number of inferior products in the market 
bearing the Cartier name grow.”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Dart, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 566, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(finding that knockoff Gucci watches would harm Gucci by discouraging consumers of the authorized 
versions “from acquiring a genuine Gucci because the items have become too commonplace and no 
longer possess the prestige and status associated with them”).  Not all of these are luxury brands, but 
apparently any popular brand now possesses the aura of exclusivity or “uniqueness.” 
 18 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 
464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955).  As Beebe notes, this rationale has been widely followed.  Beebe, supra note 
13, at 855. 
 19 Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE COMMON LAW 452 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (arguing that subjective distress from 
others’ copying, however strongly and powerfully felt, should not count as the kind of harm justifying a 
prohibition on copying). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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claim, we are returning to the protection of the powerful against lèse-
majesté. 
Trademark dilution is another doctrine that allows trademark owners to 
control emotional meaning: dilution prevents commercial actors from inter-
fering with the singular meaning of a mark even if no one is ever mistaken 
about any fact at all.  In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,20 the Second 
Circuit found that a lawn tractor ad actionably diluted John Deere’s mark 
by featuring an animated Deere logo running away in terror from a small, 
yappy dog.21  In classic defamation terms, this is an obvious nonstarter.  
While the ad denigrates Deere, it’s not in any way understandable as a fac-
tual claim.  Why then has dilution not troubled courts otherwise steeped in 
Sullivan’s defendant-protective framework? 
The most sophisticated description of the posited harm of dilution comes 
from Professor Laura Bradford.  Bradford relies on research on the signifi-
cance of emotions to decisionmaking, research that will reappear in Part II’s 
discussion of tobacco disclosures.  Notably, Bradford doesn’t argue that the 
decisions resulting from trademark-mediated emotions are based in fact.  As 
she explains, dilution can be understood as an attempt to exercise power 
over the most basic component of consumer preference: “‘affect’ or the au-
tomatic negative or positive response that a mark generates when viewed by 
a consumer.”22  Trademarks work as shortcuts, lowering the amount of ef-
fort required to make a buying decision.  Consumers readily transfer the 
pleasure they feel at making an easy decision (to choose the familiar brand) 
to their evaluation of the product and conclude that they have made a good 
decision.23 
Bradford contends that “[t]hose who use famous marks in ways incon-
sistent from the owner risk making the marks more costly to evaluate, and 
thus may cause consumers to automatically feel more negatively toward 
the original brand and affiliated products. . . . This, in a nutshell, is the 
 20 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 21 Id. at 41 (“[T]he deer in [MTD’s version of the logo] is animated and assumes various poses.  
Specifically, the MTD deer looks over its shoulder, jumps through the logo frame (which breaks into 
pieces and tumbles to the ground), hops to a pinging noise, and, as a two-dimensional cartoon, runs, in 
apparent fear, as it is pursued by the Yard-Man lawn tractor and a barking dog.  [District Court] Judge 
McKenna described the dog as ‘recognizable as a breed that is short in stature,’ and in the commercial 
the fleeing deer appears to be even smaller than the dog.  [MTD’s advertising agency’s] interoffice doc-
uments reflect that the animated deer in the commercial was intended to appear ‘more playful and/or 
confused than distressed.’”). 
 22 Bradford, supra note 12, at 1233–34. 
 23 Id. at 1234; see also Joel B. Cohen et al., The Nature and Role of Affect in Consumer Behavior, 
in HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 297, 325 (Curtis P. Haugtvedt et al. eds., 2008) 
(“[R]educing the effort involved in selecting an alternative (i.e., making a task less unpleasant) can in-
crease the price respondents are willing to pay for that alternative.  The transfer of task-related affect 
onto the valuation of alternatives underlies a growing body of research on the ‘value-from-fit’ hypothe-
sis.  According to this hypothesis, a fit between the manner in which a decision is made and the current 
orientation of the decision maker can produce pleasant task-related feelings of ‘being right,’ which can 
then be (mis)attributed to a chosen object, enhancing its perceived value.” (citation omitted)). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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harm caused by ‘blurring’ famous marks.”24  Bradford is quite clear that 
trademark fame sustains itself in large part through familiarity, and that 
consumers are mistaken about their own preferences: Repeated exposure 
increases positive feelings regardless of a consumer’s factual evaluation of 
the product or brand.  “Studies suggest that consumers are often unaware 
of the true source of the positive affect toward the brand, and misattribute 
it to the brand or product’s likeability, credibility, or suitability.”25 
Taking Bradford’s argument a step further, Professor Jerre Swann, a 
leading proponent of dilution protection, explicitly conflates emotion and 
information when he describes the qualities he believes brands should be 
able to control.26  He describes strong brands as “upward ladders of attrib-
utes, functional and psychosocial consequences, and value satisfiers.”27  
They afford “emotional benefits,” along with “self-expressive, self-esteem 
and cultural values.”28  Because emotion is the source of much trademark 
value, he concludes, other people shouldn’t be able to interfere with those 
positive emotions.29 
Yet making audiences think harder (in Bradford’s formulation) or forc-
ing them to choose from a variety of competing meanings, “experiences,” 
and opinions even when they don’t want to (in Swann’s), is in other areas 
a First Amendment value, not a harm to be avoided.30  Consider “Pepsi.  
The choice of a new generation.”31  It is nonactionable puffery, but it also 
positions Coke as uncool.  If successful, it will change Coke’s relative sta-
tus in brand hierarchies.  This is the same kind of damage that trademark 
 24 Bradford, supra note 12, at 1234 (footnote omitted). 
 25 Id. at 1267–68. 
 26 See Jerre B. Swann, The Evolution of Dilution in the United States from 1927 to 2013, 103 
TRADEMARK REP. 721, 754–55 (2013) (“‘Successful trademarks are [thus] valuable [today] because of 
the information [and emotion] they convey.’  The ‘source and quality’ brands of Schechter’s day no 
longer provide the ‘added attributes and content that consumers now want, demand and need.’  Con-
sumers today do not buy commodities, but ‘experiences . . . whose contents are largely image driven, 
intangible and symbolic.’” (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)).  Swann is referring to Frank I. 
Schechter’s classic The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927), which 
is often understood to set out the case for an American dilution cause of action to protect unique marks. 
 27 Swann, supra note 26, at 754. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See id. at 773. 
 30 Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“[W]ords are often chosen as much 
for their emotive as their cognitive force.  We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while 
solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive func-
tion which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message 
sought to be communicated.”), with Bradford, supra note 12, at 1237 (“Typically interlopers that 
evoke famous marks in advertising subtly reveal to consumers alternative understandings such as 
that some segment of the public thinks the brand is pretentious, a bad value, or simply over-
exposed.  Even if consumers process the new message only subconsciously, automatically, and in-
voluntarily, as they do with much authorized brand advertising, a resulting increase in negative feel-
ings about the dominant brand may well be welfare-enhancing and efficient.” (footnote omitted)). 
 31 E.g., GiraldiMedia, Michael Jackson Pepsi Generation, YOUTUBE (June 26, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=po0jY4WvCIc. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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dilution law makes actionable.  Under the rationale of Deere, Pepsi’s deni-
gration of Coke seems dilutive, while under the head of defamation law it 
seems to be fully protected nonfact.32 
Courts have not been receptive to First Amendment defenses in dilution 
cases.  During the post-game show of the 2010 Super Bowl, Hyundai ran a 
thirty-second commercial for its Sonata model.33  The ad consisted of brief 
vignettes that show: 
[P]olicemen eating caviar in a patrol car; large yachts parked beside modest 
homes; blue-collar workers eating lobster during their lunch break; a four-
second scene of an inner-city basketball game played on a lavish marble court 
with a gold hoop; and a ten-second scene of the Sonata driving down a street 
lined with chandeliers and red-carpet crosswalks.34 
The inner-city basketball game scene included a one-second shot of a bas-
ketball decorated with a pattern resembling Louis Vuitton’s toile LV mon-
ogram on a chestnut-brown background.  The court granted summary 
judgment in Vuitton’s favor on trademark dilution.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hyundai’s expressed motive was to contrast its offer of “luxury for all” 
with “the silliness of luxury-as-exclusivity” through “juxtaposing symbols 
of luxury with everyday life (for example, large yachts parked beside 
modest homes).”36  But the court found this deliberate evocation of Vuit-
ton’s mark as one of the examples of “old” luxury to be dilutive.37  The 
court then rejected a First Amendment defense (along with a statutory fair 
 32 One might make a distinction based on the idea that Deere involved images, not just words.  But 
as with tobacco disclosures discussed in section II.A the word/image distinction doesn’t justify a com-
pletely different rule.  Another possible argument would be that Pepsi’s braggadocio doesn’t necessarily 
denigrate Coke — a sort of “of and concerning” requirement borrowed from defamation law and ap-
plied to trademark.  But standard advertising law principles allow us to conclude that certain claims are 
implicitly comparative, and this would be one of them.  See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Consumer 
Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., Nos. 95 Civ. 7011 (HB), 95 Civ. 
7688 (HB), 1995 WL 723378 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1995) (order granting preliminary injunction) (finding 
that the statement that “[o]nly PEPCID AC has proven that it can prevent heartburn and acid indiges-
tion” was a false exclusivity claim that necessarily targeted competitors).  Coke’s market leadership 
should easily allow it to claim that it has been identified as not the choice of a new generation. 
 33 ZerCustoms, 2011 Hyundai Sonata Luxury 2010 Super Bowl Ad, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7I4v7NYHrY. 
 34 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 2012 WL 
1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at *2 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 37 Id. at *14, *19. 
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use defense) because Hyundai lacked an intent to parody, criticize, or 
comment on Vuitton specifically, as opposed to the genus of “luxury.”38  
The idea that Vuitton, as a luxury brand, could stand in for luxury brands 
generally, and be subject to commentary on luxury brands generally, was 
inherently offensive to Vuitton’s supposedly unique status. 
To let Vuitton monopolize the meaning of its brand, not just its source 
signification, leads to discrimination against certain commercial speakers 
because of the cultural “side” on which they deploy their ads.  Vuitton, 
like other advertisers, gets to use imagery and emotional appeals to en-
hance its brand reputation, but Hyundai doesn’t get to do the same to chal-
lenge that reputation.  The Supreme Court said in a case about hate speech: 
[A] State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in 
others, because the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial 
speech that justifies depriving it of full First Amendment protection) is in its 
view greater there.  But a State may not prohibit only that commercial adver-
tising that depicts men in a demeaning fashion.39 
But currently, trademark law prohibits commercial depictions of famous 
marks in a demeaning fashion.  Vuitton and other holders of famous marks 
therefore get an insulation from emotional criticism that is unavailable to 
ordinary human beings. 
One could argue that the economic injury targeted by dilution law mat-
ters.  Following Bradford’s logic, emotional effects on consumers from 
multiple meanings for Vuitton’s mark could arguably someday lead to re-
duced sales for Vuitton.40  Yet the economic-harm rationale has already 
been rejected as applied to other tort claims.  The case law on intentional 
interference with economic advantage, for example, has assimilated the 
general First Amendment rule.41  The Supreme Court refused to allow Jer-
 38 Id. at *17–20. 
 39 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 40 Cf. MICHAEL SERAZIO, YOUR AD HERE 108–10 (2013) (examining some brands’ shift away 
from the “disciplining of want and need on command,” id. at 110, toward a theory that holds that the 
existence of multiple meanings and consumer control is an indicator of brand adaptivity); ALEX WIP-
PERFÜRTH, BRAND HIJACK 41 (2005) (“The hijacked brand manager’s key job is to keep the brand 
neutral — a blank canvas, so to speak — so that the market can fill it with meaning and enrich it with 
folklore.”); Detlev Zwick et al., Putting Consumers to Work: ‘Co-Creation’ and New Marketing Gov-
ern-Mentality, 8 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 163, 167 (2008) (“Behind this ‘surrender’ is advertising and 
marketing professionals’ increasingly widespread belief that the consumer masses have become unfor-
tunately unmanageable . . . .”).  But see Paul J. Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: 
An Empirical Study of Trademark Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2533 
(2011) (disputing the harm story of dilution on empirical grounds); Tushnet, supra note 11 (same). 
 41 See, e.g., Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 109 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he de-
fenses applicable to defamation claims retain their full status for tortious interference claims if such 
tortious interference claims are based on verbal conduct.”); Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 
1184–85 (Cal. 1986) (en banc) (stating that claims for interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage that have “as their gravamen the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement . . . must satisfy the 
requirements of the First Amendment,” id.; “[i]f these limitations applied only to actions denominated 
‘defamation,’ they would furnish little if any protection to free-speech and free-press values: plaintiffs 
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ry Falwell to evade the law of defamation by suing Hustler for publishing 
an offensive cartoon about him under the label “intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.”42 
Under post-Sullivan defamation law, if a statement doesn’t make false 
factual claims, the fact that people might react to it by changing their opin-
ion of the target is insufficient to justify liability, even when the result is 
economic harm.  The slashing attacks found in caricatures are often unfair, 
but unfairness is not sufficient to allow one private party to suppress an-
other’s speech, at least on topics of public interest.43  Applying the lessons 
of defamation law, it can’t be enough to show that nonfalse use of a 
trademark resulted in economic injury, unless the regulation meets the con-
stitutional standard for banning truthful commercial speech.44 
There is a deep irony here, as Professors Laura Bradford and Mark 
McKenna have noted.45  Proponents of full First Amendment protection 
for commercial speech have repeatedly claimed that much commercial 
speech is nonfactual, and for that reason is not especially hardy or distin-
guishable from noncommercial speech.46  The pro-advertising argument 
suing press defendants might simply affix a label other than ‘defamation’ to their . . . claims,” id. at 
1184). 
 42 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 50 (1988) (describing that Falwell, a promi-
nent minister, was portrayed as stating that his “‘first time’ [having sex] was during a drunken incestu-
ous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse,” id. at 48, but holding that the First Amendment didn’t 
allow a damages award for this); id. at 55 (citing “our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be 
awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience”); see 
also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989) (upholding the First Amendment right to burn the 
American flag to express contempt for American values); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the free speech interest in mocking fa-
mous baseball players outweighed the publicity rights of the players). 
 43 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (barring a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress where the speech was in public and on a matter of public interest, albeit targeted at a 
private person); Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. 
 44 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (re-
strictions on truthful commercial speech are constitutional if they’re sufficiently tailored to a substantial 
government interest); Tushnet, supra note 11, at 554–57 (arguing that dilution law flunks the test for 
commercial speech regulations). 
 45 See Bradford, supra note 12, at 1279 (“[P]roponents of dilution law cannot have it both ways.  If 
‘involuntary’ alteration of consumer preferences is wrong, then the positive feelings generated by per-
suasive advertising are at least as problematic as any negative ones stimulated through dilutive conduct.  
If persuasive advertising can be valuable even if consumers don’t understand how they use it, then per-
haps the same might can [sic] be said for dilution by blurring.  Because the law has no inherent interest 
in product preference per se, dilution regulations must stand or fall on whether they implicate societal 
interests in promoting competition by allowing effective communication about products and services.”); 
Mark P. McKenna, The Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater First Amendment Scrutiny of 
Intellectual Property, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 26 n.63 (2006). 
 46 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 
627, 635 (1990); cf. Yoav Hammer, Expressions Which Preclude Rational Processing: The Case for 
Regulating Non-Informational Advertisements, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 435, 437 (2005) (“[M]odern ad-
vertisements hardly convey information or clear arguments.  Instead, they focus on an attempt to create 
a positive emotion within the viewers.  The messages come in mostly visual and non verbal form, and 
viewers are hardly aware of the fact that messages have been conveyed.  These characteristics of mod-
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also contends that advertising that simply makes people feel good about 
buying brand-name products is utility enhancing.  This is why we lose 
something when aggressive regulation chills nonfactual commercial 
speech.  But American regulators rarely try to suppress nonfactual com-
mercial speech — adorable spokesbears and body spray–using boys sur-
rounded by inexplicably attracted women are safe devices to build con-
sumer interest and loyalty.  Within this regime, trademark law creates 
systematic bias.  If nonfalsifiable speech about someone else’s trademark 
can be banned because it’s used only to get attention, build image, or 
amuse consumers, the result is special positional advantages given to now-
dominant brands.47  This discrimination in favor of the already powerful is 
what makes trademark law, in its role as emotional regulator, constitution-
ally problematic.48 
II.  WHEN CAN GOVERNMENT REQUIRE PRIVATE PARTIES  
TO CARRY EMOTIONAL MESSAGES? 
A similar, but more explicit, conflict exists in compelled speech doc-
trine.  Given the risks of suppressing too much speech, the government 
can’t make derogatory nonfactual speech actionable as defamation.  This 
leaves the field open to those who wish to persuade by mockery, patriotic 
or frightening imagery, and the like.  Yet what happens when the govern-
ment, rather than a private speaker, wishes to use emotion to persuade, 
perhaps to counteract private speech? 
The previous Part evaluated regulations that have structural effects on 
the messages from private parties that are available to audiences.  Here, I 
turn to direct government intervention.  Because the topic of government 
speech is so broad and unwieldy, I will focus on compelled speech rather 
than on claims in government-sponsored ads, such as “this is your brain on 
drugs.” 
Commercial speech doctrine often allows the government to mandate 
specific disclosures where advertisers would rather stay silent about incon-
venient facts.  But courts have reached inconsistent results when they iden-
tify emotion as playing a prominent role in mandated disclosures.  The 
ern advertisements are the result of advertisers’ conclusion on the basis of many psychological studies, 
that emotional and experiential advertisements, rather than informational ones, are much more success-
ful in causing viewers to internalize the advertising messages.”). 
 47 Bradford, supra note 12, at 1284 (“Dilution regulation in practice treats advertising designed to 
appeal to affective biases differently depending on whether such communications come from an estab-
lished producer or a market newcomer.  Although other areas of the law offer precedent for excluding 
affectively biasing information in the interest of accurate decision-making, such rules are usually ap-
plied consistently to every party engaging in persuasion.”). 
 48 Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (holding that, by banning only racist 
fighting words, a city violated the First Amendment, and that “St. Paul has no such authority to license 
one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry 
rules”). 
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D.C. Circuit struck down new visual tobacco warnings proposed by the 
FDA as too emotionally compromising, while other courts have upheld 
graphic abortion disclosures despite the same flaws.  This Part explores the 
tensions in these cases, arguing that appeals to emotion are inextricable 
from appeals to reason, and are therefore not inherently illegitimate. 
A.  Visual Tobacco Warnings 
As directed by Congress, in 2010, the FDA proposed enhanced warn-
ings for tobacco packages, including graphic images of the effects of long-
term tobacco use.49  A sample of these images is provided in Illustration A.  
While the concept of graphic warnings survived a facial challenge in the 
Sixth Circuit,50 the writing was on the wall when the court concluded that 
the “visual medium” is “inherently persuasive” and therefore “cannot be 
presumed neutral.”51 
A district court indeed ruled that the specific images the FDA chose 
were unconstitutional on an as-applied challenge.52  The D.C. Circuit af-
firmed, over a dissent.53  The main problem the R.J. Reynolds majority had 
was that the warnings were too emotional.54  The graphic warnings were 
not “purely” factual because “they are primarily intended to evoke an emo-
tional response, or, at most, shock the viewer into retaining the information 
in the text warning.”55  The graphic warnings were designed “to shame 
and repulse smokers and denigrate smoking as an antisocial act,” making 
the message “ideological and not informational.”56  The court of appeals 
 49 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524 (proposed 
Nov. 12, 2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012) (requiring the FDA to visually “depict[] the nega-
tive health consequences of smoking”); 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (2012). 
 50 See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 51 Id. at 526. 
 52 Perhaps ironically, the D.C. district court judge who granted the preliminary injunction striking 
down the proposed disclosures was extremely distressed by the FDA’s attempt to evoke negative feel-
ings about cigarettes, and not just convey emotionless information.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 46 (D.D.C. 2011) (condemning “emotion-provoking images” 
and the “subjective vision of the horrors of tobacco addiction”), vacated, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 
2012).  He was so outraged, in fact, that he used exclamation points several times to say as much.  See 
id. at 48, 49 n.28, 51 n.32; see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. 
Supp. 2d 266, 273 n.13 (D.D.C. 2012) (employing the exclamation point again in his grant of summary 
judgment against the FDA), aff’d, 696 F.3d 1205. 
 53 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 54 See id. at 1217 (finding that the images were “unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps 
embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting”); see also R.J. Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 272 
(“[T]he graphic images here were neither designed to protect the consumer from confusion or decep-
tion, nor to increase consumer awareness of smoking risks; rather, they were crafted to evoke a strong 
emotional response calculated to provoke the viewer to quit or never start smoking.”); Disc. Tobacco 
City, 674 F.3d at 526 (Clay, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the FDA’s choice of 
visual images is subjective, and that graphic, full-color images, because of the inherently persuasive 
character of the visual medium, cannot be presumed neutral.”). 
 55 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56 Id. at 1211. 
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reasoned that, while the government can mandate that commercial speakers 
make certain factual disclosures, the nonfactual nature of the images took 
them outside that rule. 
The FDA defended the use of images by citing research showing that 
pictures are easier to remember than words, which meant that the images’ 
health messages — smoking is bad for you — would be better received.  
The majority interpreted this as the FDA’s desire to “shock” consumers, 
but it didn’t reject the FDA’s factual claims that memory is aided by emo-
tional cues or that other alternatives had failed to make the risk message 
stick.57  Nor did the majority accept the FDA’s reliance on a “substantial 
body” of scientific literature showing that emotional responses “such as 
worry and disgust, ‘reliably predict the likelihood that consumers will un-
derstand and appreciate the substance of the warnings.’”58  The underlying 
problem in the R.J. Reynolds opinion is thus not its distrust of images, but 
the related and further-reaching distrust of emotion.59  This attitude con-
flicts with decades of research on cognition and decisionmaking, which has 
shown that emotion, including general positive or negative feelings about a 
topic, is “vital to reasoned deliberation.”60 
Under the majority’s reasoning, however, the government is apparently 
not allowed to mandate a warning that works through an emotional mech-
anism.  One immediate problem with that conclusion is that “purely” fac-
tual words also work that way.  For example, research shows that price 
signals trigger negative emotional reactions that mitigate consumers’ de-
sires for the advertised products.61  Prices cause consumers to feel bad 
about buying, mitigating positive emotions triggered by desire for the 
product.  Yet mandatory price disclosures have previously been upheld as 
acceptable regulations of commercial speech, obviously related to rational 
 57 See id. at 1216.  The dissent, by contrast, accepted the FDA’s effectiveness-based justification for 
using emotional messages: “[T]he literature suggests that risk information is most readily communicat-
ed by messages that arouse emotional reactions, and that smokers who report greater negative emotion-
al reactions in response to cigarette warnings are significantly more likely to have read and thought 
about the warnings . . . .”  Id. at 1225 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2011)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 58 Id. at 1216 (majority opinion). 
 59 See Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the Constitutional Meaning 
of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 555–56 (2014) (contesting the ready equation be-
tween image and emotion).  Courts are more likely to ignore the emotional components of words.  The 
Sixth Circuit, for example, upheld large-text warnings taking up a significant amount of space on ciga-
rette packages, despite the tobacco companies’ argument that large warnings might deter smokers from 
buying the product “by making it appear unhealthy or otherwise unattractive.”  Disc. Tobacco City, 674 
F.3d at 531 (Clay, J., dissenting in part).  The court found this to be a legitimate purpose, even though 
smokers’ reaction to a giant textual warning might not be perfectly calibrated to the factual content of 
that warning.  The court even found that the statement “‘WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your 
children.’ — written in what appears to be a child’s handwriting” would constitute a factual and accu-
rate image, and therefore would be subject only to rational basis review.  Id. at 559 (majority opinion). 
 60 Bradford, supra note 12, at 1251. 
 61 See Brian Knutson et al., Neural Predictors of Purchases, 53 NEURON 147, 153 (2007). 
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consumer decisionmaking.62  Likewise, other words can readily generate 
emotions — and the large-text warnings mandated for cigarette packs by 
Congress, and upheld as constitutional by the Sixth Circuit, may be partic-
ularly likely to do so.63 
Nonetheless, the R.J. Reynolds majority held that the graphic warnings 
were unacceptable because they didn’t provide “purely factual and uncon-
troversial” information.64  By contrast, the majority was confident that 
mandatory price-related disclosures “were both indisputably accurate and 
not subject to misinterpretation by consumers.”65  The majority construct-
ed a false dichotomy between accurate statements and misinterpretation 
(which is connected to the false dichotomy between reason and emotion).  
There is no such thing as a disclosure that is not subject to misinterpreta-
tion by consumers, any more than there is any other ad claim that is not 
subject to misinterpretation.66  People are just too variable in their atten-
tion, prior beliefs, and other cognitive resources; someone always ends up 
reading “this claim has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration” as “this claim has been evaluated by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration.”67 
The R.J. Reynolds majority further concluded that two of the images, a 
woman crying and a man wearing an “I QUIT” shirt, weren’t even “accu-
rate,” since they didn’t convey “information” about cigarettes.68  “These 
inflammatory images and the provocatively-named [1-800-QUIT-NOW] 
 62 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  Nor is this kind of 
nonrational response uncommon.  For example, meat labeled “25% fat” tastes better than the same meat 
that is labeled “75% fat free.”  Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the 
Framing of Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 
374, 376 (1988). 
 63 See, e.g., Samuel Juni & Julie S. Gross, Emotional and Persuasive Perception of Fonts, 106 
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 35, 39 (2008) (finding that different fonts affected readers’ interpreta-
tions of articles); Mareike Bayer et al., Font Size Matters — Emotion and Attention in Cortical Re-
sponses to Written Words, PLOS ONE 1 (May 9, 2012), http://www.plosone.org/article 
/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0036042&representation=PDF, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/W6TS-EQWZ(finding that larger text elicited a stronger emotional response). 
 64 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quot-
ing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Richard Craswell, “Compared to What?” The Use of Control Ads in Deceptive Advertising 
Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 772–75 (1997) (elaborating extensively on this point and explain-
ing its relevance to advertising regulation); Cornelia Pechmann, Do Consumers Overgeneralize One-
Sided Comparative Price Claims, and Are More Stringent Regulations Needed?, 33 J. MARKETING 
RES. 150, 157 (1996) (finding that disclosures could decrease the number of consumers who took away 
a false message from an ad, but also decreased the number of consumers who understood the ad’s truth-
ful message). 
 67 See Paula Fitzgerald Bone & Karen Russo France, West Virginia University, Presentation at FDA 
Public Meeting on Assessing Consumer Perceptions of Health Claims: Policy Makers’ Paradigms and 
Evidence from Consumer Interpretations of Dietary Supplement Labels (Nov. 17, 2005), archived at 
http://perma.cc/E97R-5F92. 
 68 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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hotline cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information 
to consumers.  They are unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and per-
haps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting.”69  The court 
then concluded that the nonfactual, emotionally coercive nature of the 
warnings was unjustified because the FDA provided insufficient evidence 
that the browbeating would work.70 
By contrast, the dissent accepted the FDA’s use of emotional salience 
as an indicator of effectiveness in conveying information.  “[F]actually ac-
curate, emotive, and persuasive are not mutually exclusive descrip-
tions . . . .”71  While comprehending the facts about smoking “is likely to 
provoke emotional reactions,”72 that’s a natural consequence of the reality 
that the facts are grim.73 
While the R.J. Reynolds dissent agreed with the FDA that consumers 
are currently misled about the nature and extent of the risks of smoking, 
secondhand smoke, and addiction, the majority concluded that “none of the 
proposed warnings purport to address the information gaps identified by 
the government.”74  “For example, the image of a man smoking through a 
tracheotomy hole might be misinterpreted as suggesting that such a proce-
dure is a common consequence of smoking — a more logical interpretation 
than FDA’s contention that it symbolizes ‘the addictive nature of ciga-
rettes,’ which requires significant extrapolation on the part of the consum-
ers.”75 
The R.J. Reynolds majority’s distrust of images and emotion as a 
method of conveying information is misplaced.  Research on tobacco 
warning images shows that they can correct some consumers’ underestima-
tion of the relevant risks,76 and the majority didn’t question that research 
 69 Id. at 1216–17. 
 70 Id. at 1219.  But cf. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 564–65 
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding that common sense supported the conclusion that some consumers would 
change their behavior in response to the new warnings, and the tobacco companies’ own argument that 
they needed to use color and graphics in advertising to communicate effectively with consumers sup-
ported the conclusion that the graphic warnings were reasonable: “[i]f color and graphics are necessary 
for Plaintiffs to effectively communicate and capture the audience’s attention, then warnings using color 
and graphics should more effectively convey risks than do purely textual warnings”). 
 71 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 72 Id. at 1231; see also Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 569 (“Facts can disconcert, displease, pro-
voke an emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not magical-
ly turn such facts into opinions.”). 
 73 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 74 Id. at 1215 n.8 (majority opinion). 
 75 Id. at 1216; see also Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 530 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“[C]olor graphics 
cannot accurately convey all of the health risks associated with tobacco use.  Although elements of the 
color graphics requirement may remain constant, the underlying message that they convey will vary 
with the interpretation and context of its viewer.”). 
 76 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation, 169 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 53, 64–67 (2013) (concluding that the 
images improved consumers’ factual perceptions of smoking risks, and were unlikely to cause overcor-
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and just dismissed it as identifying a constitutionally illegitimate mecha-
nism.  Nor is the majority’s contrast between multivalent images and pel-
lucid words sustainable, given the notable ambiguity of many words.77  
The majority failed to consider the images in context, which made them 
factual and truthful.  For example, the image accompanying the text 
“[c]igarettes are addictive” depicted a man smoking through a tracheotomy 
opening in his throat.78  “Viewed with the accompanying text, this image 
conveys the tenacity of nicotine addiction: even after under undergoing 
[sic] surgery for cancer, one might be unable to abstain from smoking.”79  
In fact, fifty percent of neck and head cancer patients continue to smoke 
— this image didn’t depict an extreme or unusual situation.80  Similarly, 
the dissent concluded, images of an autopsy effectively symbolized death, 
while images of a baby enveloped in smoke and of a woman crying de-
picted the significant harms of secondhand smoke.81 
Professor Caroline Mala Corbin’s careful analysis largely tracks that of 
the Reynolds dissent, with added support from social science evidence: 
provocative images of tobacco-caused harms are shocking but legitimate, 
since cigarettes really do cause death and suffering.  As Corbin explains, 
using images honors the evidence that emotionally arousing images are 
rection).  Professor Christine Jolls sharply criticized judicial assertions about the unsuitability of images 
in conveying warning information.  As she pointed out, “decades of empirical studies suggest that pure-
ly textual material may produce different beliefs about factual matters by virtue of details such as the 
choice of font; there is not a clear, pristine mapping from text statements to individuals’ perceptions 
about matters of fact.”  Id. at 57 (citation omitted).  At the same time, images are often superior to text 
alone in conveying information: “the poison symbol used on many products and the appearance of pic-
tures and diagrams throughout a typical medical or scientific text provide ready examples.”  Id. 
 77 See Goodman, supra note 59, at 566–67. 
 78 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 1232; see also Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (“People with the same illness can and often will suffer a variety of differing symptoms.  But 
one wouldn’t say that a list of symptoms characterizing a particular medical condition is nonfactual and 
opinion-based as a result.  So too with graphic images.”); Goodman, supra note 59, at 565 (criticizing 
the district court decision in R.J. Reynolds for “first imagin[ing] that the takeaway meaning for the con-
sumer is ‘autopsy’ rather than ‘death[,]’” then “imagin[ing] the consumer unable to associate the words 
and the picture”); Jolls, supra note 76, at 57 (criticizing the D.C. Circuit opinion along similar lines); 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures 32 (Apr. 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), archived 
at http://perma.cc/Q9H-KE53 (“Even if the baby has been photoshopped to look more adorable, or the 
smoke digitally enhanced, these are details unrelated to the underlying argument.”). 
  These judicial debates about the meaning and truth value of images echo philosophical debates 
over what constitutes objectivity in science.  Historically, some scientists criticized images as inherently 
subjective, while other scientists contended that images were more accurate and objective than anything 
else could be.  The latter camp was, in turn, split: Some argued that drawings could more correctly 
show the ideal example of a class, and that ideal types were more important than necessarily variable 
individuals.  Others argued that only photographic images could reveal truth.  From the perspective of 
each camp, the other concepts of truth are, or can be, misleading.  At a minimum, however, the courts 
have not explained why the First Amendment mandates a choice of one of these epistemologies as the 
correct one. 
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better at conveying risk information than dry recitations of facts.  Vivid 
images seem more personal, so that the viewer will imagine herself at risk 
rather than assuming herself immune.  Relatedly, salient images are more 
likely to be noticed and comprehended than are current textual warnings.82  
After Australia adopted similar graphic warnings, some Australians even 
reported that exposure to graphic warning labels made their cigarettes taste 
worse — a truly visceral effect.83 
However, Corbin considers one emotional pathway to be dangerous: 
mere association of smoking with negative affect, “the reverse process of 
what advertisers do when they link their product with something that trig-
gers a positive emotional response”84 hoping that the emotional response 
will be transferred from one to another.  The leap from health harms to bad 
taste made by Australian smokers is not itself rational in the ordinary 
sense.  Such “halo effects” are commonplace even with concededly factual 
claims.  For example, consumers think that “organic,” “fair trade,” and eth-
ically produced food is lower in calories.85  As long as a negative image is 
truly connected to smoking, though, Corbin considers this reaction to be a 
legitimate transfer of affect, whereas Clockwork Orange–style aversive 
conditioning — exposing consumers to images of maggot-infested meat 
next to cigarettes, for example — would be illegitimate.86  Corbin suggests 
that most of the FDA’s images were unproblematic in this regard, except 
perhaps for the woman “weeping uncontrollably,” which exploits cognitive 
shortcuts instead of relying on the merits.87 
Corbin’s reaction illustrates the difficulties of distinguishing shortcuts 
from the merits: she argues that the connection between the devastated 
woman and the warning that “[t]obacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in 
nonsmokers” may be too tenuous.88  But is it really tenuous to think that 
 82 See Corbin, supra note 81, at 40; see also Goodman, supra note 59, at 559–63 (reviewing the 
evidence that emotions aid comprehension in the context of tobacco risks). 
 83 Matt Siegel, Labels Leave a Bad Taste, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, at B1 (“‘Of course there was 
no reformulation of the product,’ the Australian health minister, Tanya Plibersek, said in an interview.  
‘It was just that people being confronted with the ugly packaging made the psychological leap to dis-
gusting taste.’”). 
 84 Corbin, supra note 81, at 40–41. 
 85 See, e.g., Jonathon P. Schuldt et al., The “Fair Trade” Effect: Health Halos from Social Ethics 
Claims, 3 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 581, 585 (2012) (describing a study in which partici-
pants evaluating chocolate provided lower calorie judgments when it was described as “fair trade” or as 
the product of ethical employment practices; “a company’s ethical actions — which logically bear little 
upon the nutrient content of its products — can nevertheless influence perceivers’ nutrient and health-
related inferences about food products”); Jonathon P. Schuldt & Norbert Schwarz, The “Organic” Path 
to Obesity? Organic Claims Influence Calorie Judgments and Exercise Recommendations, 5 JUDG-
MENT & DECISION MAKING 144, 147 (2010) (finding that Oreo cookies labeled “made with organic 
flour and sugar” receive lower calorie judgments than do regular Oreo cookies, even though the two 
products contain the same number of calories). 
 86 See Corbin, supra note 81, at 41. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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nonsmokers who contract fatal lung disease will be mourned?  Or even 
that smokers who discover that an intimate has fatal lung disease will feel 
guilt?  These extrapolations are fairly far from the entirely unrelated nega-
tive images (for example, the rotting meat) that we both agree would be 
unfair.  It is these rational but not perfectly correlated associations that the 
government will most often want to make when it imposes disclosure re-
quirements.  Unlike private advertisers using sex and pleasure to sell prod-
ucts, government mandates aren’t likely to associate completely unrelated 
things. 
But private advertisers’ willingness to sell products with positive im-
agery has to be considered as well in any full analysis of the constitutional 
issues.  As noted in Part I, commercial sellers — including tobacco com-
panies — routinely and even predominantly use images and nonfactual 
matter to make their products attractive.  If imagery can distort rational 
judgment, R.J. Reynolds makes it impossible for the government to correct 
tobacco advertisers’ own distortions with a countervailing emotional appeal 
at the very point where that emotion is likely to have an influence: the 
time a decision is made to smoke. 
The government isn’t operating on an empty, emotionless field.  In-
stead, it is reacting to decades of careful image construction by tobacco 
companies.  Cigarette manufacturers have long made their products taste 
better and seem safer using techniques that manipulate emotions through 
colors and other imagery.89  Research, much of it from the tobacco com-
panies themselves, demonstrates that packaging matters to perceptions of 
taste and other qualities: consumers believe that cigarettes in light-colored 
packages are less dangerous than other cigarettes,90 while plain packaging 
that prevents most branding efforts diminishes cigarettes’ appeal.91  As 
Corbin explains: 
People are bombarded with images of happy people presumably puffing away 
with no ill effect.  Because of the availability heuristic, people evaluate proba-
bility based on the examples that most easily come to mind . . . . Thanks to 
ubiquitous tobacco advertisements, the most available image of smokers is one 
of happy, active people, which will influence people’s calculation of the risk of 
 89 See Goodman, supra note 59, at 556 & n.263. 
 90 See, e.g., David Hammond & Carla Parkinson, The Impact of Cigarette Package Design on Per-
ceptions of Risk, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH 345, 346, 349 (2009); Melanie Wakefield et al., The Cigarette 
Pack as Image: New Evidence from Tobacco Industry Documents, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL i73, i76 
(2002). 
 91 See, e.g., Crawford S. Moodie & Anne Marie Mackintosh, Young Adult Women Smokers’ Re-
sponse to Using Plain Cigarette Packaging: A Naturalistic Approach, BMJ OPEN (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/3/3/e002402, archived at http://perma.cc/BG75-JL5S (reporting that 
plain cigarette packaging was associated with lower ratings of enjoyment and satisfaction of smoking 
than fully branded packaging, that study participants reported closer scrutiny and consideration of 
health warnings on plain packs, and that plain packaging was associated with decreased consumption 
and increased thoughts of quitting). 
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smoking.  In addition, this one-sided presentation exacerbates what is known 
as optimism bias, which also distorts the evaluation of risk.92 
Given this context, the R.J. Reynolds majority gave unduly short shrift 
to the FDA’s argument that previous efforts to combat tobacco ad cam-
paigns had been “like bringing a butter knife to a gun fight.”93  The Sixth 
Circuit has also held, in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United 
States,94 that the government can’t constitutionally prevent tobacco manu-
facturers from using colors and images in the first place, at least not at 
such a high level of generality.95  Mandatory plain packaging, a regulatory 
solution gaining international momentum, is thus constitutionally off limits 
in the United States.  R.J. Reynolds and Discount Tobacco City amounted 
to a one-two punch leaving tobacco companies alone the ability to use 
emotion and imagery.96 
Subsequently, R.J. Reynolds was interpreted in a case about the appro-
priate remedies for the tobacco companies’ multidecade fraud under the 
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, United States 
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.97  The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia ordered the defendants to publish corrective statements, each 
beginning: “A Federal Court has ruled that the Defendant tobacco compa-
nies deliberately deceived the American public about the health effects of 
smoking, and has ordered those companies to make this statement.  Here is 
the truth . . . .”98  The required statements were blunt with little of the 
complexity of ordinary legal discourse, such as: “It’s not easy to quit.  
When you smoke, the nicotine actually changes the brain — that’s why 
 92 Corbin, supra note 81, at 35–36 (footnotes omitted). 
 93 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 94 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 95 See id. at 548.  The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, and 21 U.S.C.), mandated black text on a 
white background for any labeling or advertising, except in circumstances unlikely to reach juveniles.  
Striking this provision down, the Sixth Circuit quoted Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 
(2011): “[T]he State may not seek to remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace by 
prohibiting truthful, nonmisleading advertisements that contain impressive endorsements or catchy jin-
gles.  That the State finds expression too persuasive does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden 
its messengers.”  Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 546 (quoting Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The government’s argument was that colorful advertising distracted potential 
users from the harms of tobacco use and created positive lifestyle associations that overrode risk infor-
mation.  Id.  This was not a claim of deception.  The mere fact that tobacco ads, like all ads, tried to 
create positive associations was insufficient to justify a blanket ban on images.  Id. at 547.  There could 
be nondeceptive color- or image-based ads, including ads intended to “reinforce” consumer preferences 
by simply showing the package.  Id. 
 96 The government can engage in emotional appeals in separate campaigns — at least if the court’s 
holding condemning emotion doesn’t extend to direct government speech, a complicated issue in itself 
— but it can’t reach smokers on the pack, the most direct way of countering tobacco companies’ own 
emotional appeals. 
 97 907 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 98 Id. at 8. 
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quitting is so hard.”99  The tobacco companies argued that the language 
was too emotional and punitive to survive R.J. Reynolds.100 
The district court disagreed.  It was allowed to require “purely factual 
and uncontroversial disclosures.”101  The images in R.J. Reynolds were 
“‘not meant to be interpreted literally,’ which raised concerns that [they] 
‘could be misinterpreted by consumers,’” and they were intended to evoke 
an emotional response, so they weren’t just “pure attempts to convey in-
formation.”102  By contrast, the required corrective statements contained 
no pictures and were purely factual, clear, and accurate.103  The district 
court was bound by the R.J. Reynolds majority’s condemnation of emotion, 
and thus was required to conclude that clearly judgmental statements were 
somehow nonemotional. 
Following R.J. Reynolds, mandatory warnings also needed to be “non-
controversial” to receive relaxed constitutional scrutiny.104  According to 
the district court, R.J. Reynolds found images controversial when they were 
“‘subject to misinterpretation’ and required ‘significant extrapolation on the 
part of consumers,’”105 though neither of those statements really seems to 
be about controversiality.  Unlike the images, the corrective statements at 
issue in Philip Morris were noncontroversial because they were “simple de-
clarative sentences and basic, uncomplicated language.”106  The defendants 
argued that the preamble was “controversial” because it intended to evoke 
an emotional response, calling it “unprecedented, self-denigrating lan-
guage.”107  Disagreeing, the Philip Morris court held that, given a nearly 
fifty-year record of deceptive claims and the established likelihood of future 
legal violations, the preamble provided “important and necessary context 
for the consumer to understand the accurate information that follows.”108 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 15. 
 101 Id. at 21. 
 102 Id. at 14 (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 
(D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
 103 Id. at 15–16. 
 104 Id. at 14.  Understandably, the court found that controversy had to mean more than that the de-
fendants “simply disagree with a particular proposition that has been decided against them.”  Id. at 17–
18. 
 105 Id. at 18 (quoting R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. (quoting Defendants’ Reply to Pub. Health Intervenors’ Response to U.S. Submission of Pro-
posed Corrective Statements & Expert Report at 3, Philip Morris, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 5889)). 
 108 Id. at 23.  The tobacco companies also proposed alternate statements, whose content provides a 
useful example of the use of words to trigger attitudes that affect “factual” evaluations.  Instead of the 
mandatory statement that secondhand smoke causes disease, they wanted to phrase the statement of fact 
“as merely a ‘conclusion’ held by either the Surgeon General or ‘public health officials,’” id. at 26 n.14, 
as if well-established fact “were a mere opinion held by public health officials, rather than representing 
a consensus held by the scientific community at large,” id. at 26.  The court rejected this blatant attempt 
to play on consumer distrust of government. 
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Yet of course these required statements are likely to trigger emotional 
reactions; the actual facts are distressing.  Without a fuller account of the 
role of emotion in judgment, the contortions into which the district court 
was forced in order to disavow and minimize these emotional realities are 
likely to be repeated elsewhere, further distorting First Amendment doc-
trine.  There are better approaches to emotional appeals than that offered 
by the R.J. Reynolds majority, as I’ll discuss in Part III. 
B.  Abortion Disclosures 
While R.J. Reynolds invalidated visual tobacco warnings, courts have 
mainly upheld a different set of emotional interventions related to abortion.  
I depart from many critics of mandatory abortion-related disclosures in ac-
cepting the idea that emotional government appeals are legitimate.  The re-
al concerns — shared by critics of emotional appeals as well — relate to 
factual misleadingness, burdens on the practical ability to obtain an abor-
tion, and misattribution of the government’s message to doctors. 
Many recent abortion regulations attempt to influence women’s deci-
sions by providing them information with a distinctly antiabortion flavor.  
Some of this information involves hotly contested or arguably false factual 
claims; some involves claims whose factual nature is disputable; and some 
involves information produced through technological means, such as the 
sound of the fetal heartbeat and the image of the fetus produced through 
mandatory sonograms (which can involve physical penetration of the 
woman’s body).  All this information is united by the goal of inducing 
women to reject abortion by making them feel that abortion is the wrong 
choice.  And yet, unlike tobacco disclosures, courts have upheld these re-
quirements.109 
For example, the Eighth Circuit upheld South Dakota’s requirement 
that physicians provide their patients with a written statement informing 
women contemplating abortions that a “known medical risk[] of the [abor-
tion] procedure” is an “[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide,”110 
even though the best available scientific studies suggest that abortion is 
“psychologically benign.”111  The majority concluded that this statement 
about increased risk didn’t suggest a causal relationship between abortion 
and an increased risk of suicide, and was therefore not false or misleading 
because of the possibility of causation.112  By any normal standard, the re-
 109 See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 
2012) (finding that the First Amendment provides no constraint if required disclosures are “truthful, 
nonmisleading, and relevant”); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905 
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 110 Rounds, 686 F.3d at 894. 
 111 Brenda Major, Psychological Implications of Abortion — Highly Charged and Rife with Mislead-
ing Research, 10 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1257, 1258 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112 Rounds, 686 F.3d at 898–99. 
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quired disclosure is clearly misleading.113  Correlation may not be causa-
tion but reasonable listeners, using the ordinary rules of implicature, would 
undeniably receive the message that having an abortion caused the in-
creased risk.  It would have been just as “true” to mandate a disclosure 
that people who take Advil have an increased risk of headaches. 
Another element of the law required physicians to give women a writ-
ten statement indicating that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, 
separate, unique, living human being.”114  An Eighth Circuit en banc ma-
jority concluded that this statement was truthful and nonmisleading, in 
light of the statutory definition of “human being,” even though it could al-
so be “read to make a point in the debate about the ethics of abortion.”115  
This is sleight of hand: the legislature may have defined “human being,” 
but the recipients aren’t being asked to read the specific definition.  In-
stead, women seeking abortions have to hear this claim in the context of 
other statements designed to make abortion seem undesirable — and the 
claim itself includes so many adjectives that its very presentation testifies 
to the emotional appeal.  The idea that an embryo or fetus is a “whole” 
and “separate” human being, despite not actually being separable from a 
pregnant woman, is at best a nonfactual claim.  In my view, the claim is 
legitimate only to the extent that the government may legitimately express 
an antiabortion viewpoint, and to the extent that doctors are not required to 
endorse the government’s viewpoint, only to offer it.116 
Another intervention, forcing pregnant women to view fetal images and 
hear fetal heartbeats, attempts to trigger emotional responses and therefore 
to induce women to reverse an initial decision to abort.117  While issues of 
physical intrusion and increased cost or delay should themselves justify re-
jection of such mandates on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, my focus 
here will be on the First Amendment arguments against them.  Professor 
Carol Sanger has described mandatory ultrasounds as “harassment mas-
 113 See, e.g., Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(“A claim is conveyed by necessary implication when, considering the advertisement in its entirety, the 
audience would recognize the claim as readily as if it had been explicitly stated.”); Sterling Drug, Inc. 
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 741 F.2d 1146, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding unevidenced claims misleading 
when surrounded by the trappings of scientific proof); cf. Richard J. Harris et al., Memory for Implied 
Versus Directly Stated Advertising Claims, 6 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 87, 93–94 (1989) (finding that 
young adult consumers recall implied claims as if they had been stated directly). 
 114 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 115 Id. at 735 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116 I should note that I support a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that would prevent the gov-
ernment from disfavoring abortion, on equality grounds.  But I don’t think the First Amendment bars 
the government from expressing its viewpoint any more than it should bar tobacco warnings. 
 117 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 81, at 45–46 (pointing out that ultrasounds are magnified, and heart-
beats amplified; “[a]s a result, women might conclude that the fetus is larger, stronger, and more devel-
oped than it actually is,” id. at 46, and the social meaning of heartbeats and ultrasounds — associated 
with and even metonymic for wanted babies — can contribute to that misleadingness); id. at 49 (“Just 
as the heartbeat is shorthand for alive, an ultrasound image is shorthand for a wanted baby.”). 
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querading as knowledge,”118 characterizing proponents’ motives as 
grounded in “hope . . . that the fetal image will overwhelm the decision to 
abort by triggering something like a primitive maternal instinct. . . . [The 
ultrasound requirement] is less an appeal to reason than an attempt to 
overpower it.”119  But at the same time, courts have viewed these require-
ments as purely factual disclosures.120  Abortion opponents use the lan-
guage of consumer protection.121  They hope that these mandated disclo-
sures will turn a “confused customer” into a “mother,”122 even though the 
evidence that this disclosure works is minimal.123 
While courts have treated all these abortion requirements as “truthful” 
and “nonmisleading,” there is no way that they would satisfy the standard 
applied in the tobacco cases.  Among other things, the Reynolds majority 
didn’t just require literal truth.  The judges believed, based on their own 
review, that the images would be misleading.  In other areas of the law, 
too, literal truth can still be deceptive and therefore unacceptable.124  At 
the very minimum, a consistent approach would have required the gov-
ernment to prove that its mandated abortion disclosures were both nonmis-
leading and effective in deterring abortions.  Perhaps it’s too much to hope 
that abortion jurisprudence will bear any relationship to the rest of First 
Amendment law.  But the disconnect is especially blatant with respect to 
 118 Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 360 (2008). 
 119 Id. at 396–97. 
 120 See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (“To belabor the obvious and conceded point, the required disclosures of a sonogram, the 
fetal heartbeat, and their medical descriptions are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading infor-
mation.”); cf. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 
WL 373132, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (“As this Court reads the [Fifth Circuit] panel’s opinion, an 
extended presentation, consisting of graphic images of aborted fetuses, and heartfelt testimonials about 
the horrors of abortion, would be ‘truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant.’”). 
 121 See, e.g., Lauren Conley, Sen. Kintner Proposes Abortion Clinic Changes, KHAS (Mar. 2, 2014, 
10:56 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/KN2R-K4M2 (discussing a proposed bill requiring clinics to 
post signs stating that women can’t be coerced or forced into an abortion; the bill’s author compared 
disclosure to “signs in bars about fetal alcohol syndrome,” airplane safety lectures, and “all kinds of 
warnings that we put out there that we think people need to see during critical times”). 
 122 Corbin, supra note 81, at 48 (quoting Steven Ertelt, Victory: Appeals Court Upholds Texas’ Ul-
trasound-Abortion Law, LIFENEWS.COM (Jan. 10, 2012, 12:17 PM), http://www.lifenews.com 
/2012/01/10/victory-appeals-court-upholds-texas-ultrasound-abortion-law, archived at http://perma 
.cc/A3PQ-KU9T). 
 123 See, e.g., Mary Gatter et al., Relationship Between Ultrasound Viewing and Proceeding to Abor-
tion, 123 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 81, 83–84 (2014) (study of over 15,000 women seeking abor-
tion care finding minimal effects from viewing ultrasound images; 98.4% of pregnancies were termi-
nated when women viewed ultrasound images, while 99.0% were terminated when they didn’t; viewing 
was not associated with continuing a pregnancy among the substantial majority of women with high 
decision certainty, but it was associated with continuing a pregnancy among the 7.4% of women with 
medium or low decision certainty). 
 124 See, e.g., Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing that the literal truth can be misleading and therefore can be banned from commercial speech). 
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mandatory emotional appeals.125  While the D.C. Circuit rejected evidence 
that disclosures improved smokers’ risk knowledge because that evidence 
didn’t show any effect on actual smoking behavior, the Supreme Court has 
not required actual evidence that mandatory disclosures affect abortion 
choices,126 and that evidence doesn’t seem to exist. 
There is much scholarly criticism of mandatory ultrasounds and similar 
requirements on the ground that they attempt to manipulate women rather 
than respect them as autonomous decisionmakers.127  I share this judgment 
as a policy matter and don’t believe that there’s any information deficit 
that needs to be addressed in abortion clinics.  But there are two considera-
tions worth bearing in mind: First, relying on the position that emotional 
appeals are off limits to the government could have broad and destructive 
effects if it were applied consistently across fields.128  From military re-
cruiting to imposing courtroom architecture that impresses on participants 
the seriousness of the judicial process, government regularly structures be-
havior through emotional appeals. 
Second, and relatedly, the conclusion that mandatory abortion disclo-
sures are not factual depends on empirical claims about what women who 
choose abortion know.  As Professor Dan Kahan and his coauthors have 
explained, larger belief frameworks routinely affect factual assessments.129  
Thus, the legislative or administrative factfinding that underlies a disclo-
 125 Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1218 n.13 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (“[W]e are skeptical that the government can assert a substantial interest in discouraging 
consumers from purchasing a lawful product, even one that has been conclusively linked to adverse 
health consequences.”), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (plurali-
ty opinion) (holding that states may further the “legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn” 
through “legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing 
the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion”). 
 126 Compare R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219–20 (“FDA has not provided a shred of evi-
dence . . . showing that the graphic warnings will ‘directly advance’ its interest in reducing the number 
of Americans who smoke. . . . [I]t is mere speculation to suggest that respondents who report increased 
thoughts about quitting smoking will actually follow through on their intentions. . . . The [Regulatory 
Impact Analysis] estimated the new warnings would reduce U.S. smoking rates by a mere 0.088%, a 
number the FDA concedes is ‘in general not statistically distinguishable from zero.’” (citation omit-
ted)), with Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure 
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to 
abort the infant life they once created and sustained.  Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 127 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 81, at 3. 
 128 Corbin, for example, argues that, while emotional appeals are not off limits because they’re emo-
tional, it is unacceptably manipulative to intentionally take advantage of common heuristics.  Corbin, 
supra note 81, at 2. 
 129 See Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct 
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 854–55, 883 (2012) (experiment showed that factfinders tasked with 
distinguishing between protected “speech” and unprotected, dangerous “conduct,” id. at 854, varied in 
their judgments depending on whether they believed the protest they witnessed conformed to or con-
flicted with their own political views) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  See generally Dan M. Ka-
han, Essay, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Difference Does It Make?, 92 
MARQ. L. REV. 413 (2009) (discussing the role of cultural cognition in factual assessments). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
R TUSHNET - BOOKPROOFS WITH COMMENTS.DOC 05/14/14 – 7:38 PM 
26 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 127:1 
sure regulation will appear solid to some people and vaporous to others.  
It’s therefore not surprising that legal commentary that has considered both 
tobacco and abortion disclosures can find the former legitimate given the 
law’s aim to convey facts through emotional means and the latter illegiti-
mate given the law’s emotional manipulativeness.130  But the people who 
favor abortion disclosures don’t (just) see emotional manipulation as ac-
ceptable — they see themselves as supporting greater levels of understand-
ing by the unfortunately ignorant women who are making choices in the 
absence of full knowledge.131  That is why the compelled disclosures make 
(purportedly) factual claims about risks and fetal heartbeats, rather than as-
serting that abortion is murder. 
Above, I recounted Corbin’s argument for using image-enabled heuris-
tics to increase the salience of information on the risks of tobacco and to 
combat optimism bias.  Consider in this light her argument against manda-
tory ultrasounds and similar measures: “[E]xposing women to images and 
sounds with pre-existing emotional connotations exploits affective priming.  
Because all the same information can be imparted without the auditory and 
visual embellishment, the heartbeat and ultrasound images and descriptions 
are added to provoke an emotional reaction.”132  An ultrasound attempts to 
associate the fetus with a wanted child, “more like an advertisement of a 
coffee machine with a fetching woman,” and even though the relationship 
between fetus and wanted child is closer than the coffee-sex connection, 
“the cognitive mechanism of transferring the emotions aroused by one onto 
the other is the same.”133  I have a hard time seeing why the association 
here is inherently more illegitimate than the association between smoking 
and a corpse on the autopsy table.134 
Corbin argues that mandatory abortion-disclosure laws are paternalistic 
because they presume that women are likely to regret decisions to have 
abortions.135  But that’s not standard paternalism, where the state decides 
what’s good for you even if you never agree.  Instead, the state’s position 
is that a woman’s future self is sufficiently likely to have a different per-
spective on the present decision — much like a current smoker and that 
smoker’s future self.  We may disagree about the likelihood that these re-
grets will materialize, but the two situations can’t be separated on their 
 130 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 81, at 3.  See generally Goodman, supra note 59 (while expressing 
more skepticism, presenting the issue in a way much more sympathetic to tobacco disclosures than to 
abortion disclosures). 
 131 See, e.g., Michael P. Vargo, The Right to Informed Choice: A Defense of the Texas Sonogram 
Law, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 457, 459 (2012). 
 132 Corbin, supra note 81, at 55 (footnote omitted). 
 133 Id. 
 134 The claim of manipulativeness is also somewhat diminished by Corbin’s own citation of evidence 
that these mandates don’t actually stop women from getting abortions.  The heuristics triggered are ap-
parently insufficient to change behavior, though the mandates may still cause considerable pain. 
 135 Corbin, supra note 81, at 52. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
R TUSHNET - BOOKPROOFS WITH COMMENTS.DOC 05/14/14 – 7:38 PM 
2014] MORE THAN A FEELING 27 
logic, only on their facts.136  And the state, absent the constraints of Loch-
ner v. New York, often has a great deal of freedom to find facts.  In both 
cases, the state is in essence trying to construct people who will believe 
today that certain decisions are the right ones, for their own future good as 
well as the good of others (the fetus and people who bear the costs of oth-
ers’ smoking). 
Given this government aim, focusing on the emotionality of the gov-
ernment’s appeal may divert us from the more basic question of whether 
the appeal ought to be allowed.  In this vein, the reasoning behind one 
common analogy deployed against abortion disclosures demonstrates how 
our underlying concepts about which choices are rational affect our con-
clusions about acceptable emotional appeals.  Critics of graphic abortion 
disclosures often make the point that graphic images of ordinary surgery 
aren’t considered necessary for informed consent to surgery137: 
The fact that the average person would be disgusted and disturbed by a de-
tailed description of heart surgery does not warrant requiring such a descrip-
tion as a condition of effective consent.  On the contrary, most patients would 
likely rather not hear the description because it would only increase their anxi-
ety about a procedure they know they must undergo.138 
Rationally, the argument goes, the fact that surgery is bloody and gross 
shouldn’t deter someone who needs it. 
But imagine a state with a substantial population of Jehovah’s Witness-
es and Christian Scientists.  Would they agree that the only rational, neces-
sary choice is surgery?  Is society prepared to accept the existence of rea-
sons to reject surgery that acknowledge its potential efficacy but value 
other considerations more?  To press further: consider that in many cases, 
surgery is not the only option — there may be other possible treatments, or 
a patient nearing the end of her life may choose not to attempt to extend it 
through surgery given the costs in pain and recovery time.  To the extent 
that graphic images make more salient the physical costs of surgery, they 
could be justified in such situations. 
Many dry and nonsalient statements don’t actually improve deci-
sionmaking, since they aren’t noticed or understood by the recipient.  If 
 136 One could argue that freedom from addiction is distinctively autonomy enhancing, in a way that 
freedom from abortion is not.  See Corbin, supra note 81, at 54.  But then, it’s not the emotional appeal 
that matters, but rather the addiction — any measure would perhaps be justified to save people from 
addiction. 
 137 See, e.g., Peter Ferony, Note, Constitutional Law — From Goblins to Graveyards: The Problem 
of Paternalism in Compelled Perception, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 205, 238 (2013) (“It would be ab-
surd to force people who are going to need surgery anyway to hear the gruesome details of the upcom-
ing procedure, just as it would be absurd to force people who attempt eating challenges to hear the 
gruesome details about morbid obesity.  These conversations add nothing of substance to the decision, 
and only serve to scare the decision-maker.”). 
 138 Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Viola-
tions of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20 (2012). 
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risk disclosure is necessary for informed consent in any but the most for-
malistic sense, then there’s at least a case that it needs to be done in a 
graphic way.  Just as an image of a crying woman concretizes and stands 
for the many costs of tobacco use, or the image of a fetus stands for a hu-
man life, surgical images are directly related to considerations that a pa-
tient could rationally take into account. 
The surgical analogy doesn’t seem to prove the point for which it is of-
fered, although it may prove a somewhat different point also advanced by 
critics of mandatory abortion disclosures: such mandates discriminate in a 
constitutionally significant way between a choice made uniquely by wom-
en and other medical choices, and this discrimination is likely to reflect 
sexist assumptions about women’s rational capacities.  To the extent that 
the state is deploying emotional appeals in a biased way — and especially 
to the extent that it is forcing doctors to represent the state’s emotional 
opinions as their own139 — arguments against forced disclosures are still 
available even if general appeals to emotions are constitutional. 
First Amendment arguments presently have more purchase in courts 
than do equality arguments, and the tactical reasons for making First 
Amendment claims against abortion restrictions are powerful.  But so far, 
they haven’t been very successful.  That struggle should invite us to ques-
tion whether the line between rationality and emotionality is capable of de-
livering the outcomes progressive scholars want. 
III.  THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF  
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF EMOTION 
So far I’ve supported (some) emotional appeals the courts have ruled 
off limits, and criticized emotional regulations the courts have allowed.  I 
hope not to be a pure contrarian, however.  This Part considers what les-
sons can be taken from this survey.  Consistency may be unattainable, and 
total consistency undesirable, but we can do better than the directly con-
flicting principles featured in the existing cases. 
A.  All Decisions Involve Emotion and Heuristics 
It is now well recognized that emotion is a crucial component of deci-
sionmaking.140  There is no weighing of alternatives, or judgment between 
them, without emotions guiding choices.141  If emotional appeals are ma-
 139 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 81, at 54. 
 140 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 81, at 24–26 (reviewing the literature); Goodman, supra note 59, at 
516–17. 
 141 See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HU-
MAN BRAIN 36–39 (1994); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 105–10 (2008); Terry A. 
Maroney, Essay, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629, 642 
(2011) (arguing that emotion “reveals reasons, motivates action in service of reasons, enables reason, 
and is educable”). 
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nipulative, then all appeals are manipulative.  Some decisions don’t look 
like they’re emotionally influenced, often because the cultural definition of 
“emotional” decisions excludes those that make certain interactions flow 
smoothly.142  But that just means the emotion is invisible, not that it’s ab-
sent.143  The reality that emotions are inextricably intertwined with reason 
means that many of the conventional arguments for distinguishing legiti-
mate and illegitimate government interventions into the marketplace for 
speech misdescribe the world, and therefore don’t work. 
Advertising provides the most obvious examples.  People are regularly 
influenced by aspects of presentation that have no rational relationship to 
decisions.  In one especially striking study, a photo of a smiling, attractive 
woman in the bottom right-hand corner of a loan offer produced an in-
creased response rate for men equivalent to dropping the monthly interest 
rate by 200 basis points, or approximately 25% of the total rate — a sub-
stantial percentage.144  The recipients didn’t get any increased exposure to 
the woman by accepting the offer; even if they valued her smile at 200 ba-
sis points, taking the offer because of that smile was irrational.145  More 
generally, because of the halo effect, consumers think products with one 
desirable attribute also have other, logically unrelated but also desirable at-
tributes.146  We’re regularly influenced in ways we’d be embarrassed to 
admit, if we even acknowledged that we’d been influenced. 
It gets worse: as noted in the discussion of prices in section I.B, all 
“factual” information triggers emotion.  A store’s announcement of a price 
cut induces consumers to feel they’re getting a bargain, generating sales 
that wouldn’t have taken place if the sale price had always been the 
price.147  Information that one choice is the most popular leads other peo-
 142 These perceptions of rationality regularly have a gendered component.  See Corbin, supra note 
81, at 25 n.161. 
 143 Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1459 (2013) 
(“Treating emotional appeals as forbidden allows them to proceed when unnoticed — as when judges 
embellish the facts in capital appeals or augment their own authority by treating legal texts as having 
obvious meanings — but not when such appeals are transparent . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 144 Marianne Bertrand et al., What’s Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit 
Marketing Field Experiment, 125 Q.J. ECON. 263, 280, 296 (2010). 
 145 See id. at 280. 
 146 See Schuldt et al., supra note 85, at 581. 
 147 See Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] product’s ‘regular’ or 
‘original’ price matters; it provides important information about the product’s worth and the prestige 
that ownership of that product conveys.  Misinformation about a product’s ‘normal’ price is, therefore, 
significant to many consumers in the same way as a false product label would be.  That, of course, is 
why retailers like Kohl’s have an incentive to advertise false ‘sales.’” (footnote omitted) (citations omit-
ted) (citing Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising: Informative or De-
ceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 52, 55 (1992) (“By creating an impression of savings, the 
presence of a higher reference price enhances subjects’ perceived value and willingness to buy the 
product.”); id. at 56 (“[E]mpirical studies indicate that as discount size increases, consumers’ percep-
tions of value and their willingness to buy the product increase, while their intention to search for a 
lower price decreases.”))). 
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ple to choose it as well.148  Other, equally manipulable heuristics abound.  
Framing a decision as avoiding a loss produces different results than fram-
ing it as producing a gain.149  Information and emotions can’t be unlinked. 
B.  Can the Government Avoid Exploiting Emotion? 
With respect to mediating private disputes, it’s desirable for the gov-
ernment to refuse to allow liability when a defendant’s nonfactual speech 
affects audiences’ evaluation of the plaintiff.  This is the rule of Sullivan 
and should be the rule in trademark law as well.  In that sense, it is possi-
ble for the government to be hands off with respect to certain kinds of pri-
vately generated emotion, though emotion will necessarily remain one 
mechanism by which factually false claims can cause harm. 
However, the government may also wish to require certain disclosures 
from commercial speakers, and here disconnection from emotion is impos-
sible.  Some have argued that the proper inquiry in evaluating required 
disclosures is whether the government intends to change behavior along its 
preferred lines, or merely to inform.150  But the government will always 
have both purposes when it requires disclosure.151  Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel,152 the classic commercial speech disclosure case, 
found a lawyer’s failure to disclose that consumers would have to pay 
court costs even if they lost their cases to be deceptive because that liabil-
ity would matter to a significant number of consumers.153  If it would mat-
ter, it would change at least some behavior: that’s what it means for infor-
mation to be material. 
 148 See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 88 (2007) 
(“[O]ne means we use to determine what is correct is to find out what other people think is correct. . . . 
The tendency to see an action as more appropriate when others are doing it normally works quite 
well.”); Matthew J. Salganik & Duncan J. Watts, Leading the Herd Astray: An Experimental Study of 
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in an Artificial Cultural Market, 71 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 338 (2008) (examin-
ing how the popularity of songs in a “music market” influenced individuals’ consumption of music). 
 149 See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 2–10 (2009); cf. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The 
Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2008) (examining cogni-
tive biases that promote the overuse of credit cards). 
 150 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and 
the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 574 (2012); cf. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & 
Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1236–37 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (criticizing the government for attempting to 
command consumers to stop smoking). 
 151 See Goodman, supra note 59, at 515 (“Any investigation of these issues must start with the 
recognition that government often seeks simultaneously to inform and to influence consumer purchases 
by mandating product disclosures.”); cf. id. at 546 (“Government labeling schemes will often use nor-
mative judgments to construct evaluative facts or to thrust facts into special prominence. . . . [T]he 
choice to highlight sugar on a front-of-pack label reflects a norm that sugar is special among ingredi-
ents. . . . What is considered ‘organic’ is built on judgments about animal husbandry and agricultural 
health.  This evaluative fact is then embedded in a normative system that uses labels to promote the 
market for organic goods.” (footnote omitted)). 
 152 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 153 Id. at 651–53. 
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Nonetheless, one might take the position that the government can’t 
mandate “any non-rational messages,” at least when there are “less emo-
tionally burdensome” alternatives, however that might be determined.154  
This argument relies on the idea that individual autonomy is harmed by 
compulsory emotional appeals, but not by purely factual disclosures.155  
But it’s not clear why the emotion is doing the work in this claim, rather 
than the compulsion.  Even forcing someone to sit through rational appeals 
involves an interaction that wouldn’t have occurred in the absence of gov-
ernment intervention. 
If the government does have a legitimate interest in having people be-
come aware of certain information, then emotion has to enter into the cal-
culation of how to deliver that information.  Humans are, as Professor Dan 
Ariely says, predictably irrational.  We are and will remain poor deci-
sionmakers who rely on salience over statistics.  Salience is produced by 
concrete, human examples that trigger emotional reactions.  A purely ra-
tional statement is likely to make no impact, cognitively speaking.  Be-
cause emotion and reason are inextricable, emotional appeals should be 
fair game for the government as well as for private parties, unless the emo-
tion is tied to factual deception.156 
C.  Mandatory Disclosure and Autonomy 
Just because emotion is inevitable in communication, does the govern-
ment therefore have complete freedom to appeal to our emotions when it 
can justify a mandatory disclosure?  Many of the currently proposed limits 
on mandated speech turn out, on closer examination, to be unsatisfactory.  
I don’t claim to solve the problem, but a focus on factual misleadingness 
would point us in the right direction.  (I set aside here considerations such 
as the magnitude of the burden on speech — requiring each tobacco seller 
to sing a four-minute aria before handing over a pack would raise distinct 
concerns.  So would mandating disclosure for noncommercial speakers, 
though that doesn’t seem to have given courts upholding abortion-
disclosure mandates much pause.  Instead, my arguments relate to the dis-
tinction between emotional and “nonemotional” disclosure mandates, given 
that some mandatory disclosure is constitutionally acceptable.) 
The basic problem with mandatory disclosures from the audience’s per-
spective is that they can seem overbearing: lecturing, judging, even dispar-
aging our choices.  At worst, they exert the kind of pressure we might 
 154 Ferony, supra note 137, at 226. 
 155 See id. at 231. 
 156 Admittedly, deceptiveness is a pretty big “unless,” and anyone adhering to this rule would face 
serious challenges distinguishing deception from mere factual disagreement.  But it’s likely the best 
available distinction, and courts do claim expertise in identifying deceptiveness.  See, e.g., Corra v. En-
ergizer Holdings, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (explaining that falsity or mislead-
ingness is “the type of factual question that is routinely committed to the courts”). 
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want to call interference with autonomy.  However, compulsory disclosure 
isn’t compulsory affirmation.  As long as the citizen retains the ability to 
disagree with the government — to choose to smoke, to choose to have an 
abortion — she can exercise choice, albeit under constraint; and some con-
straint is part of the human condition.157  We first have to identify exactly 
what kinds of hardiness we expect from citizens before we determine that 
any given state message puts them under too much pressure.  Insulating 
citizens from challenges to their opinions, for example, is probably not 
conducive to the ability to debate and judge that the First Amendment or-
dinarily honors.  Thus, we might well want the government barred from 
lying to citizens, but not from conveying its nonfalse opinions.158 
Making sure consumers receive information that a commercial speaker 
doesn’t want to give them is particularly important when the government’s 
purpose is to promote fair marketplace transactions.  (If abortion seems too 
distinctive, substitute cosmetic surgery in the general argument about au-
tonomy.)  The government isn’t the only entity addressing the citizen.  If 
she’s vulnerable to emotional manipulation by the government, then she’s 
probably vulnerable to other kinds of emotional manipulation.159  Other 
entities are already selecting what messages they want her to hear and 
pressing them on her.  Even accepting that deliberate appeals to emotion 
create autonomy problems, her autonomy is profoundly at risk already, and 
perhaps the government should step in to help her restore that autonomy.  
For example, researchers studying the halo effect have suggested that its 
existence could justify stronger regulation of apparently innocuous claims, 
since labeling chocolate “fair trade” might be inducing consumers to over-
eat.160 
Consider a hypothetical from Professor David Strauss: 
  Suppose that the government could manipulate people’s minds directly, by 
irradiating them in a way that changed their desires.  No one would say that 
 157 See Goodman, supra note 59, at 548 (“It is hard to see how communicating with value, by itself, 
undermines consumer autonomy.  In First Amendment cases, courts have scoffed at the notion that con-
sumers are so fragile that they lose independent decision-making ability when faced with compelling 
narratives.  False advertising law similarly trusts consumers to withstand persuasion and exercise choice 
in the swirl of tendentious speech.” (footnote omitted)). 
 158 Again, to the extent that state mandates have other effects, such as raising the costs of private 
speakers’ speech and falsely making it seem as if other people endorse the government’s view, those 
effects would also be relevant, particularly to undue burden analysis.  See supra TAN 139. 
 159 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 81, at 27 (arguing that standard image advertising, which attempts to 
create positive associations by showing an advertised product in conjunction with something the audi-
ence already values, constitutes “intentional exploitation of a cognitive shortcut”). 
 160 See Schuldt et al., supra note 85, at 585–86 (“[E]thical or values-based claims (e.g. fair trade) 
frequently appear on poor nutrition foods. . . . To the extent that such claims encourage consumers to 
view poor nutrition foods as healthy, the government might seek to regulate their appearance on food 
packaging as they currently do for other types of claims.”). 
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the power to ban an activity automatically included the ‘lesser’ power to irra-
diate people so that they no longer had the desire to engage in that activity.161 
But could the government ban private parties from irradiating people, on 
the ground that this activity harmed the victims’ autonomy?  Could it drug 
people to reverse the effects of that private irradiation?  To the extent that 
the government argues that it is operating in an already emotion-saturated 
field such as that created by tobacco advertising, it becomes harder to 
identify illegitimate manipulation. 
Corbin accepts that not all emotional appeals are wrongfully manipula-
tive, even if emotion makes them more persuasive.162  Instead, she con-
tends that government persuasion infringes autonomy “if the government’s 
goal represents one side of a controversial debate, or if the government’s 
means involve emotional appeals that take advantage of affect heuris-
tics.”163  Corbin looks to whether the government’s attempt to change citi-
zens’ minds on “contested” questions fails to respect their autonomy: 
 So, for example, compelled factual information that attempts to persuade you 
to do something you agree is ultimately autonomy-enhancing and therefore in 
your best interests, such as eating nutritious foods, would not be troublesome.  
But the state’s persuasion becomes problematic when it takes sides on a con-
troversial issue and presumes to know better than the individual what is 
best.164 
While potentially appealing as a policy matter, this standard (autono-
my-enhancing and uncontroversial disclosures are acceptable) requires a 
much thicker account of autonomy than I expect courts could endorse or 
even agree on,165 and would also put every disclosure at risk.  First, in to-
 161 David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 
360 (1991).  This scenario is not necessarily hypothetical.  See, e.g., James Gorman, Agency Initiative 
Will Focus on Advancing Deep Brain Stimulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2013, http:// 
w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 3 / 1 0 / 2 5 / s c i e n c e / p e n t a g o n - a g e n c y - t o - s p e n d - 7 0 - m i l l i o n - o n - b r a i n - r e s e a r c h 
 . h t m l, archived at http://perma.cc/FT9L-TV22. 
 162 See Corbin, supra note 81, at 24–26 (noting that because emotion is central to decisionmaking, 
autonomous, rational decisionmaking will still have an emotional component). 
 163 Id. at 66. 
 164 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted); see also Goodman, supra note 59, at 550 (“‘Uncontroversial’ should 
be given a distinct meaning, having to do with government motive.  We should be skeptical of disclo-
sures that, even if purely factual, are designed to advance a controversial ideology as opposed to a gen-
erally accepted norm.”). 
 165 As Professor Ellen Goodman persuasively explains, autonomy is undertheorized at precisely the 
point of concern — what outside interferences not amounting to violence or fraud count as autonomy 
diminishing.  See Goodman, supra note 59, at 556–59 (reviewing the literature).  Professor Seana 
Shiffrin posits that a person is autonomous, and therefore not manipulated, when she reasons for her-
self.  Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 205, 213 (2000).  But being offered new information or even emotional appeals does not 
itself preclude reasoning for oneself.  It makes intuitive sense to distinguish between providing infor-
mation and getting the audience drunk; both affect reasoning and both might be voluntarily accepted by 
the audience, but there does seem to be something distortive and unfair about getting one’s audience 
soused.  The interesting question is whether any communicative intervention rises to the level of intoxi-
cation.  See Goodman, supra note 59, at 557 (“[A] disclosure requirement that tries to get a consumer 
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day’s politicized environment, everything is contested — from whether the 
oceans are rising to whether obesity is a public health problem or merely a 
series of individual decisions.  In fact, two thoughtful defenders of the 
controversiality standard even disagree about whether “eat[] nutritious 
foods”166 labeling mandates are controversial.167  Sarah Palin has made 
political hay out of similar nutritional initiatives, rendering them “contro-
versial.”168  Before Professor Randy Barnett and a few like-minded souls 
successfully propounded the theory that a health care mandate was unjusti-
fied by the Commerce Clause, the argument was generally considered be-
yond the pale of the post-Lochner settlement.169  The existence of global 
warming was widely accepted by the American public within recent 
memory; now it is “controversial,” having been caught up in the widening 
divide between Democratic and Republican worldviews.  When Republi-
cans like a dog less when they’re told it’s President Obama’s dog, we’re 
well beyond consensus.170 
The problem is magnified for those, like Professor Ellen Goodman, 
who want to expand the idea of “controversiality” to cover situations in 
which it’s not the existence of facts, but their relevance, that is contest-
ed.171  As Professor Douglas Kysar has demonstrated, consumers’ prefer-
to do something by depriving him of the ability to reason for himself would be autonomy reducing.” 
(second emphasis added)). 
 166 Corbin, supra note 81, at 23. 
 167 Compare Goodman, supra note 59, at 567 n.347 (concluding that mandatory labeling of 
“health[y]” foods would be unconstitutional because the categorization would be controversial (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), with Corbin, supra note 81, at 23 (noting that such labeling mandates 
“would not be troublesome”).  It’s worth noting that the FDA already regulates — though it does not 
mandate — the use of similar terms, such as low-fat and low-calorie, barring them on certain foods that 
don’t meet other nutrition standards.  See, e.g., Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1062 
(N.D. Cal. 2013).  It appears that Goodman’s controversiality standard would invalidate these existing 
regulations, and possibly multiple other FDA regulations whose justifications are at least as hotly dis-
puted by manufacturers who’d prefer lower standards of proof. 
 168 See Kate Andersen Brower, Sarah Palin Stews over Government Food Rules, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 18, 2010), h t t p : / / w w w . b u s i n e s s w e e k . c o m / m a g a z i n e / c o n t e n t / 1 0 _ 4 8 
/b4205044187091.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/HE5W-F35M (“The federal government has been 
issuing nutritional advice for more than a century and has been generating controversy almost since 
then. . . . Obama’s nutrition efforts ‘really irritate small government conservatives,’ says Ross Baker, a 
political science professor at Rutgers University.  ‘The Tea Party’s message,’ he says, is ‘back off, peo-
ple should be able to make mistakes even if it involves gorging themselves on too many nachos.’”). 
 169 See generally Randy E. Barnett, Lecture, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and 
Why Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331 (2013). 
 170 See Sasha Issenberg, It All Comes Down to Race, SLATE (June 1, 2012, 11:03 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/06/racicalization_michael_tesler_s_th
eory_that_all_political_positions_come_down_to_racial_bias_.html, archived at http://perma 
.cc/9AH8-H646. 
 171 Goodman, supra note 59, at 552–53.  Goodman’s examples of standards for assessing the pres-
ence of widely shared norms — obscenity and cruel and unusual punishment law, see id. at 554 n.252 
— don’t leave me with much hope; those fields of law don’t seem like models of clarity, and the sub-
ject matter at issue for commercial disclosures is much broader and thus even more contestable. 
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ences are not stable and depend on what gets disclosed to them.172  Dis-
closure at the point of purchase makes conditions of production (whether a 
product was made with child or slave labor, whether it contains genetically 
modified organisms, and so on) more salient and removes “moral wriggle 
room.”173  As a result, we face a choice between a vision of a marketplace 
in which “consumers satisfy their personal interests unimpeded by concern 
for the welfare of others” and one in which consumers behave in accord-
ance with more “altruistic ideals” held by the norm entrepreneurs who fo-
cus on particular conditions of production.174  These ideals may involve 
animal welfare, union labor, foreign production, or something else.  Kysar 
concludes that neither set of behaviors reveals “true” preferences.175  Ra-
ther, context and the ability to see how one’s choices affect others deter-
mine behavior, meaning that the choice of a disclosure regime is funda-
mentally normative. 
Goodman’s own expectations about relevance reveal the instability of 
“controversiality” in this sense.  She argues that requiring the disclosure of 
sugar content on a nutrition label, “so consumers can make informed 
choices and hopefully reduce sugar consumption,” is plainly on the uncon-
troversial side of the spectrum, by contrast to requiring country-of-origin 
disclosures, “so consumers can make informed choices, and hopefully 
move manufacturers to rely more heavily on domestic sugar.”176  This as-
sessment is not, so far as it appears, based on any actual evidence of 
shared norms.  Though I’m not aware of direct comparative studies on 
point, “buy American” ideologies seem extremely popular with Ameri-
cans,177 while active attempts to reduce sugar consumption are not obvi-
ously so.178 
 172 See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regu-
lation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 628 (2004). 
 173 Id. at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 174 Id. at 631–32. 
 175 Id. at 632. 
 176 Goodman, supra note 59, at 553. 
 177 See, e.g., C. Min Han, The Role of Consumer Patriotism in the Choice of Domestic Versus For-
eign Products, 28 J. ADVERTISING RES. 25 (1988); Oliver St. John, Made in USA Makes Comeback as 
a Marketing Tool, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2013, 10:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com 
/story/money/personalfinance/2013/01/21/made-in-usa-trend/1785539, archived at http://perma.cc 
/QZ8X-95TR (“Over 80% of Americans are willing to pay more for Made-in-USA products, 93% of 
whom say it’s because they want to keep jobs in the USA, according to a survey released in November 
by Boston Consulting Group.”); cf. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 13-5281, 2014 WL 
1257959, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2014) (upholding a country-of-origin disclosure mandate as “purely 
factual and non-controversial”), vacated and en banc reh’g granted on other grounds, No. 13-5281 
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2014). 
 178 In one experiment, for example, willingness to pay for sugar-free varieties of blueberry products 
varied a fair amount among groups of consumers, and for some products was actually negative.  
Wuyang Hu et al., Consumer Acceptance and Willingness to Pay for Blueberry Products with Noncon-
ventional Attributes, 41 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 47, 58 (2009) (“Consumers in general are not 
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“[G]ermaneness,” which Goodman poses as another limit on the con-
troversiality standard,179 seems equally manipulable if it’s used to rule 
country-of-origin labeling off limits.  Why isn’t country of origin perfectly 
germane to any product decision, since it’s something consumers might 
reasonably care about?  A broader definition of germaneness, however, 
might have promise as a limit — though it wouldn’t be much of a limit on 
required disclosures, excluding only the kind of Clockwork Orange classi-
cal conditioning mentioned in Part II above.180  Overall, whether a posi-
tion is controversial can and should be distinguished from whether the 
means of conveying the government’s position are illegitimate. 
Even setting controversiality aside, the idea of autonomy-enhancing dis-
closures is complicated by the absence of a coherent theory of autonomy 
under pressure.  Almost everyone would want to make decisions that are the 
best for themselves, all else being equal.  We just disagree on what those 
decisions would be.  Though Corbin equates them in her proposed formula-
tion, something that is autonomy enhancing is not necessarily in a person’s 
best interests.181  If autonomy is not an overriding virtue for a person, for 
example, some autonomy-diminishing decisions — like making it harder 
for her to smoke, or to have an abortion — might well serve her best inter-
ests.182  Even Corbin’s example, government persuasion in the direction of 
eating nutritious foods, is not necessarily both autonomy-enhancing and in 
a person’s best interests.  A hedonist might prefer a shorter, tastier life.  Or 
government pressures to eat more nutritiously might lead a person to misal-
locate her resources, if those resources were sufficiently constrained.183 
attracted by the sugar-free feature for muffin mix.  In fact, individuals with a college degree must be 
compensated by $0.95 to make them choose a sugar-free package of blueberry dry muffin mix.”). 
 179 Goodman, supra note 59, at 553. 
 180 In addition, even if the disclosures were germane, their cost might have constitutional weight if 
the government required so many disclosures that the underlying commercial appeal became too expen-
sive to carry out.  See id. at 543; see also Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 
1996) (raising the specter of an unending list of required disclosures that, while truthful, would still be 
unconstitutionally burdensome). 
 181 See Corbin, supra note 81, at 38 (suggesting that both truth/nonmisleadingness and an autonomy-
enhancing effect are required for a mandatory disclosure to be constitutionally valid). 
 182 Cf. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 161–63 (1984) (inves-
tigating the value orientations of pro-choice and anti-abortion activists and finding that the latter believe 
that the option of abortion, along with other options for women, harms women in traditional relation-
ships by making it easier for men to avoid responsibility).  As Professor Kristin Luker’s work indicates, 
this perspective is not just a question of people who get thrills from dangerous or harmful activities.  
They may perceive a variety of benefits from shared constraints on choice. 
 183 See Lindsay McLaren, Socioeconomic Status and Obesity, 29 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 29, 35 
(2007) (explaining that nutritious foods are more expensive); cf. African-American Organization Urges 
FDA to Stop Deceptive Marketing of “No rBST” Milk, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 14, 2006, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/African-American+Organization+Urges+FDA+to+Stop+Deceptive 
+Marketing...-a0155882092, archived at http://perma.cc/DS7S-9AHR (arguing that marketing some 
milk as hormone free deceptively encourages poor people to spend too much money on that milk). 
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D.  Accommodating the Inevitability of Emotion 
Because emotional components are inevitably a part of reasoning, iden-
tifying emotionality can’t be the end of any inquiry into the acceptability 
of a government regulation.  A doctrine that condemns emotional manipu-
lations is particularly likely to block policy innovation, since the emotional 
valences of existing arrangements are harder to see. 
Consider the recently popular governmental interventions aimed at 
“nudging” consumers to behave differently.184  Nudges aim precisely to 
work through noncognitive, nonrational heuristics.  For example, putting 
the healthy choices at eye height and hiding the unhealthy choices so that 
they’re easy to overlook in the cafeteria are attempts to leverage a con-
sumer’s laziness, regardless of her present or future preferences, in the ser-
vice of a broader policy goal.185  This structuring of the perceptual envi-
ronment doesn’t address the consumer in her capacity as a person who 
exercises choice.  Indeed, it presumes that she doesn’t often do so.186  Per-
haps worse, the nudgers’ tactic of making certain choices easier exploits 
exactly the kind of affect heuristic that worries people like Corbin and 
Goodman: easier decisions seem better because they’re easier, despite the 
lack of logical connection between the two.187  Compared to the effects of 
such nudges on autonomy, at least explicitly emotional appeals allow citi-
zens to bring their “persuasion knowledge” to bear and fight off the ap-
peals.188 
One might solve the nudging problem by treating nonverbal nudges as 
not “speech” and thus not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all, and 
that position would decrease the number of situations in which nudging 
implicates compelled speech.  But that seems like a cop-out, or at least a 
 184 One can imagine various hypotheticals testing this point.  Attempts to change the emotional 
makeup of the public, for example through various initiatives in schools promoting emotional intelli-
gence and “character” education, may or may not be misguided.  But it seems hard to argue that they 
should be unconstitutional, especially when the alternative is another form of public schooling that it-
self will elicit and shape certain kinds of emotional responses.  Or suppose that, relying in part on evi-
dence that the rich are less empathetic than other people, the legislature raises taxes on the most 
wealthy: is this motive constitutionally suspect? 
 185 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 40–52 (2009) (describing self-control strategies and oth-
er similar nudges). 
 186 See, e.g., Brian Wansink & Andrew S. Hanks, Slim by Design: Serving Healthy Foods First in 
Buffet Lines Improves Overall Meal Selection, PLOS ONE 4 (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.00770
55&representation=PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/B2JS-9XS9 (finding that food order at buffet trig-
gers different choices, and suggesting that people can be led to make healthier choices by presenting 
fruit first and thereby interrupting the cultural script that eggs, potatoes, and bacon should be eaten to-
gether). 
 187 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 188 See, e.g., Cassi G. Matos, Note, The Unbranding of Brands: Advocating for Source Disclosure in 
Corporate America, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1307, 1319–20 (2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (discussing ways in which consumers resist persuasive messages). 
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solution in need of a robust defense of “speech” autonomy over other 
kinds of autonomy.  Further, a number of the nudgers’ solutions, from red-
yellow-green symbols on food189 to presenting retirement savings options 
in specified ways190 to putting pictures of eyes on websites to remind con-
sumers that their privacy is at risk,191 would be speech even under a re-
strictive definition thereof.192  The problem of circumventing not just deci-
sions, but citizens’ understandings that there was a decision to be made in 
the first place, would remain. 
The nudgers point out that there is no such thing as a neutral default — 
all situations configure choices.193  Though a decision can be framed as 
avoiding a loss or achieving a gain, there’s no choice but to use some 
frame or other.194  And this need for framing is also true of abortion and 
tobacco disclosures.  Even in the absence of topic-specific government 
mandates, what providers would tell consumers and patients would be pro-
foundly shaped by law, particularly tort law.  It’s no answer to say that tort 
law is neutral and that mandatory disclosures aren’t, because even if, coun-
terfactually, there were such a thing as “the” law of tort, that would just 
return us to a level-of-generality problem: regulators make topic-specific 
rules because they’re convinced that the ordinarily good-enough general 
rules aren’t working in particular cases, but they can always appeal to the 
same ends as those of the general rule. 
Ultimately, I can’t see why the government can’t express its prefer-
ences, even in emotional terms, as long as it isn’t deceptive about those 
preferences.195  At least with respect to commercial speech, this should 
 189 See, e.g., Bryan Thomas & Lawrence O. Gostin, Tackling the Global NCD Crisis: Innovations in 
Law and Governance, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 16, 19–20 (2013). 
 190 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1176 (2003). 
 191 See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1027, 1039–40 (2012). 
 192 Of course, corporations are already shaping choices with the same techniques.  Unfortunately, 
this strategy just gives them incentives to make the best possible arguments that regulations requiring 
them to present options in particular ways constitute compelled speech.  See generally Lauren E. Willis, 
When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155 (2013) (discussing the many successful 
ways motivated businesses can defeat behavioral interventions with their own techniques and speech, 
including resort to the First Amendment). 
 193 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 190, at 1182 (“[T]here is no way to avoid effects on behavior and 
choices.  The task for the committed libertarian is, in the midst of such effects, to preserve freedom of 
choice.”). 
 194 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1437 (discussing 
different potential frames for messaging antismoking campaigns to avoid stigmatizing people with 
smoking-related disabilities). 
 195 See Goodman, supra note 59, at 557–58 (discussing the autonomy-disrespecting effects of decep-
tion); David A. Strauss, supra note 161.  Because these concepts are also important for identifying what 
the government can ban private parties from saying, not just what the government can mandate, it 
should be noted that deception can also occur when additional material, such as color and music, dis-
tracts the audience from comprehending or retaining disclosures.  The FTC and FDA have long recog-
nized this potentially deceptive tactic.  See, e.g., Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 61 (1991) (“Generally rec-
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give the government significant freedom to require disclosures, even ones 
that concededly rely on emotional appeals to communicate information.  
As for private causes of action like defamation and trademark dilution, the 
inevitability of emotion provides support for the defamation rule: the law 
shouldn’t intervene as between different emotional appeals unless there is 
an underlying factual falsity. 
In both contexts, paying less attention to emotionality in itself would 
go hand in hand with increased emphasis on factual misleadingness, ideal-
ly backed by empirical research.  The weak point of defamation doctrine is 
that it often approves assumptions about audience reaction, but that model 
need not be emulated.  Lawyers already know how to ask people whether 
an ad communicates a claim to them.  We already have empirical evidence 
that tobacco disclosures correct more in the way of risk misperception than 
they cause, despite the D.C. Circuit’s fears.196  Courts could focus on the 
practical burdens to choice imposed by abortion regulations, and in the 
case of disclosures, specifically ask whether disclosures, whether verbal or 
visual and whether literally true or literally nonfactual, communicate false 
statements of fact about risk, fetal pain, or something else.  Because facts 
are so contestable, this approach would not have any prospect of ending 
disputes over legitimate speech regulations.  But it would, I think, have the 
virtue of honesty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ognized marketing principles suggest that, given the distracting visual and audio elements [of the televi-
sion ad at issue] and the brief appearance of the complex superscript in the middle of the commercial, it 
is unlikely that the visual disclosure is effective as a corrective measure.”), aff’d, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
 196 See supra notes 74–76; see also, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 
F.3d 509, 565 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A]pproximately 95 percent of youth smokers and 75 percent of adult 
smokers report that the pictorial warnings have been effective in providing them with important health 
information.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Ad-
vertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,641 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141 (2012)) (“The 
overall body of scientific evidence indicates that health warnings that evoke strong emotional responses 
enhance an individual’s ability to process the warning information, leading to increased knowledge and 
thoughts about the harms of cigarettes and the extent to which the individual could personally experi-
ence a smoking-related disease.”); James F. Thrasher et al., Cigarette Warning Label Policy Alternatives 
and Smoking-Related Health Disparities, 43 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 590, 598 (2012) (finding that 
adult smokers with low health literacy found image warnings more personally relevant and credible 
than text). 
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ILLUSTRATION A: U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
CIGARETTE HEALTH WARNINGS197 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 197 The FDA provides high-resolution images of all of the agency’s cigarette health warnings for 
download by the public.  See Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/labeling/ucm259214.htm, (last updated May 15, 2013) archived at 
http://perma.cc/9V5M-YGP3. 
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